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Abstract 
 
 
OPTIMIZATION OF CRIME CONTROL RESOURCES IN A SOCIETY 
 
By  
 
Steven Thompson Masters of Science 
 
Utah State University 
 
2011 
 
Major Professor: Shannon Peterson 
Department Economcis 
 
 
 This paper looks at the economics of crime control through the Phillips-Votey 
Societal Cost Function model and mathematically proves that there is a socially 
optimal point at which society should be devoting resources towards the prevention 
of crime.  This allows the society to minimize the social cost of crime given a 
theoretical cost constraint.  This paper take the model further by conducting 
comparative analysis to determine the effect that changes in the functional form of 
crime generation, and crime prevention will have on society as represented in the 
model.  This paper also looks at the counter intuitive effect that growth in per capita 
GDP has a negative effect on crime rates, as a follow up to recently published article 
in The Economist magazine.  We will expand this to see if this pattern continues for 
other countries with high rates of poverty.  It also explores the social economical 
causes of crime generation by looking at Steven Ralphael’s paper The Effect of 
Unemployment on Crime and Richard Rosenfeld and Steven Messner paper The 
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Social Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies adding a multinational 
dimension to Ralphael’s paper.  This paper expands the Messner and Ralphael 
model by not only reproducing the OLS regression but by also using a fractional 
logit regression to create a more robust model.  This paper uses the fractional logit 
regression in order to get a better idea how social economic factors such as 
unemployment rates and monetary inequality may influence crime.   
 This paper then looks at the largest portion of a state’s expenditure of crime 
control, the use of prisons to see how effective they are in reforming prisoners and 
acting as a deterrent for future criminal behavior of this former prison population.   
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Existing Literature 
 
 The purpose of this paper is three fold, first to prove mathematically that 
there exists an optimal point for a society in which they should devote their 
resources to minimize the social cost of crime.  The basis for the theoretical model 
comes from Llad Phillips and Harold Votey Jr. book The Economics of Crime Control 
(1981).  Where Phillips and Votey create a model to explain crime control resources 
in a society, this paper will expand this model to allow for comparative analysis of 
Phillips Votey model.   The Phillips Votey model was selected because it had the 
theoretical microeconomic construct that was conducive to allow us to look at both 
the cost created by the crime and crime resources.   It is well accepted and 
frequently used in current literature and it allows the reader to achieve a greater 
microeconomic understanding of the entire effect of crime on society.  Most other 
models look at the effect of the cost of the crime and not the cost and resources 
associated with crime control, the Philips Votey Model looks at both.     
 After showing the theoretical minimal point this paper will look at current 
crime control resource expenditures in the United States to see how those 
expenditures compare to the theoretical minimization point proven by this paper.   
 The Second point of this paper is to find the Social Economical causes of 
crime generation.  Although the Phillips Votey model recognizes that social 
economical causes as an important source of crime generation, they do not explore 
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the social economic forces that drive crime generation, so this paper will use data 
from Liska, Chamlin and Reed’s Article Testing the Economic Production and Conflict 
Models of Crime Control which looks at social inequality determined by both income 
inequality and racism as possible influences on crime.  This paper will focus mainly 
on social inequality as well as with per capita GDP to see if that may be one of the 
reasons for the crime generation process.  This paper will start by comparing the 
per capita GDP of two similar political structures (Republics, made up of three 
branches of government legislative, judicial and executive with the largest portion of 
power coming from the legislative branch and a law structure based on English 
common law) that have large portions of data available to the public to see how 
changes in per capita GDP may affect crime rates.  The two countries we are 
comparing are India and the United States.  This will show that as per capita GDP 
increases that both of these countries see an increase in specific types of crime, and 
that certain types of crime decrease in the United States with decreased change in 
per capita GDP, where in India those same crimes increase, we will explore why in 
this paper.  
 The third point of this paper is to explore utility model for a recently released 
prisoner in order to show how a society can allocate resources most efficiently 
towards decreasing the probability of recidivism.  There have been a number of 
studies which indicate the effectiveness of prisons and causes of recidivism.  Michael 
Jacobson in his book Downsizing Prisons: how to reduce crime and End Mass 
Incarceration (2005) argues that increased prison sentences do not reduce crime.  
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Joan Petersilia in her book When Prisoners come Home argues that there exists a 
number of aspects that effect prison reentry into society, housing, age at the time of 
the prisoner’s release from prison, racism,  inmate participation in prison programs, 
biases against prisoners to achieve employment, prior incarceration, use of the 
parole system, and drug treatment in prison.  Lipton, Martinson and Wilks in their 
book The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment 
Evaluation Studies conducted a meta-analysis which showed the effectiveness of 
supervision during the probation period, increased skill development, individual 
counseling, group counseling and Milieu therapy.  This paper expanded these 
studies by creating a microeconomic model which shows how a released prisoner 
would optimize their utility given an economic constraint and how such 
optimization could result on recidivism depending on the utility and cost structure 
of our prisoner.   
Introduction 
 
 In 2006 crime cost the average American at least $344 either directly as a 
result of being a victim of crime or indirectly in taxes paid for crime prevention. One 
of the largest and seemingly most ineffective tools towards crime prevention in the 
United States is the prisoner reform system.  In 1978, the United States spent $5 
Billion to operate the nation’s prisons; this figured has increase in nominal terms by 
more than 1300% to $72 billion in 2007.  Increased spending on correctional 
facilities has caused a significant strain on the states, which on average spend 7% of 
their state budget on correctional facilities.  As the demographics of the inmates are 
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changing, because of increased life spans and a growing part of the prison 
population with an age of 40+ years, this figure is predicted to increase significantly.  
The reason for this impending increase is because prisoners over 41 years of age on 
average cost the state $66,000 a year, compared to $22,000 for adults under 40, 
much of this cost is because of higher cost of medical cost.  If the present nationwide 
rate of growth continues, it will be necessary to build the equivalent of two new 
prisons every week just to keep pace.  Prior incarceration has been a poor deterrent 
for future violation of crime.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics a person 
with a criminal history will be about 882% percent more likely to go back to prison 
than a person that was never previously incarcerated. (Statistics, 2007) (Jacobson, 
2005) (Schmidt and Witte, 1988) (Bonczar & Beck, 1997) 
Many crimes have a portion of the crime that has a measurable economic loss 
to the victim and to society.  If a criminal burglarizes a victim, the victim has a fixed 
monitary loss as a result of the burglary, but there is also a non-monitary cost to the 
crime felt by the victim.  The victim may feel less safe, increased fear, anger, or some 
other unwanted emotion as a result of the crime.  The criminal would have some 
utilitary gain from preforming the action, in the example above the criminal would 
receive an economic gain as a result of the burglary.  This gain will likely come at 
some cost to the criminal, for example the time spent looking for people to 
burglarise could have be spent doing some other action to gain utility.   
This paper would like to acknowlege the fact that not all crimes have a 
negative economic effect on society.  Some crimes may actually have positive effects 
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on society for example Rosa Parks’s refusal to change seats on a city bus, but for the 
analysis used in this paper it will make the assumption that the crime we are 
discussing has a positive effect for the criminal they gain some utility as a result of 
breaking the law, a negative effect for the victim(s) and the overall cost to society 
will be less than or equal to zero.   This next portion of this paper intends to prove 
that there exist a cost minimizing point which will be most beneficial for a society in 
expending resources to prevent criminal activity.  
Creating a metric for measuring the impact of crime rates on society 
 
In order to make this model work a few assumptions and definitions need to 
be established; first crime in our model is defined as an act by some actor within 
society that is both deemed as a social bad, and that society is willing to allocate 
resources towards the prevention of said action.  Second that crime is non-
increasing with increased crime control resources (L), third with no crime control 
measures in place society would be at a suboptimal position.  These assumptions are 
made because it reflects an optimal strategy in the real world.   First if a society was 
at an optimal position with no crime resources expenditures it would signify one of 
two things; that the expenditures were redundant because no crime exists in the 
society, or that in each case crime control resources were used crime was always 
non-decreasing, this would mean that nothing a society could use would deter 
crime. The second assumption would mean that a society was not cost minimizers 
and hence not utility maximizes therefore the society would be irrational.  The 
conclusion can be made that the total impact of crime on society is equal to the 
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impact of crime plus the resources used to deter crime. Llad Phillips and Harold L 
Votey Jr. in their book The Economics of Crime Control created a model for crime 
control.  The variables are the following socioeconomic causal factors (SE), create a 
vector of m degrees of felony offenses (OF), m represents the specific type of felony 
offenses.   Societal programs (SP) which are used to diminish the socioeconomic 
factors that create criminals, examples of these societal programs would range from 
transfer payments that help low income households, intercity youth leagues for at 
risk youth, or even the civilian conservation corps, intended to placate youth during 
economic hardships at the time of the Great Depression.  The costs of the societal 
programs are indicated by C1(SP) this is born by society via the criminal justice 
system.  (L) is a vector of resources used by the criminal justice system, L represents 
resources used for law enforcement and prosecution, e.g. police salaries, cost of 
prisons, and the purchase and maintenance of police vehicles.  L is a (n) dimensional 
vector where n represents the number of resources available to prevent crime.  The 
conviction ratio (CR) is a measure of the “certainty” of punishment, CR is seen as a 
deterrent along with the severity (SV), usually measured as the time of the sentence 
served.  The cost associated with the severity is represented as C2(SV).  Given a set 
level of felony offenses (OF), an increase in L would increase CR.  Making the 
assumption that that more money spent on crime control given a fixed level of crime 
will result in more criminals being successfully prosecuted.  (w) is the vector of cost 
associated with L. w is a n dimensional vector with each subgroup of cost associated 
with the corresponding subgroup in L, for example L2 is associated w2, to illustrate 
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this point with a practical example lets assume that L2 is an individual that could 
work as a police officer, w2 would represent the forgone benefits to society losses to 
have that person stopping crime, so if he could have been a sculpture, w2 represents 
the number of sculptures not made because the person was deterring crime.   This 
paper make the further restriction that each good or service in L  where 1 
here represents the upper bound of the possible resources that could be used in 
crime prevention. Zero is the lower bound because we are assuming that there 
cannot be negative resources allocated to crime control using this and the 
assumption made before that 0 is a suboptimal solution therefore L  
represents the area allowable for an optimal solution we are insured that we have 
an interior solution.  The crime imposes a cost to society either through the loss or 
damage of property, or through the cost in terms of loss of safety, later in this paper 
we will use a metric created to measure the loss in monetary terms.   The loss rate 
(r) is the implied social costs. (r) is a vector of m values corresponding with OF  
Thus the total cost to society (S) is calculated through the following formula: 
S=rOF + wL + C1(SP) + C2(SV)  
 (Equation 1) 
Figure 1 (appendix)  is a reproduction of Llad Phillips, and Harold L Votey Jr. 
explanation of these variables which allows the reader to have a visual 
understanding of the variables.  (Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981) 
The offense rate is a determined by a function of the conviction ratio, severity 
of punishment and socioeconomic causal factors (g). Socioeconomic factors are 
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determined by a function of social programs (h).  And the conviction ratio is 
determined by a function of the offense rate (f) 
OF = g(CR, SV, SE)  
SE = h(SP) 
CR = f(OF,L) 
(Equation 2) 
 
We are placing the following assumptions on our functions.   
 
 
 
 
(Equation 3) 
 
From the derivations of equation 2 you can see that a full partial derivative of L will 
dictate that an increase in L will cause a decrease in OF, and increase in SP will cause 
a decrease in OF, and from the above partial derivatives we see that an increase in 
SV will decrease OF.    This means that if there are more crimes committed it would 
be harder to prosecute any one crime given a set of constrained resources, if we 
increase those resources but keep the number of crimes constant then we would be 
more likely to prosecute any one crime committed.  Also it shows that crimes would 
decrease if the person committing the crime was more likely to be prosecuted for 
committing the crime, if the penalty for committing the crime would go up or if 
there were more social economical programs in place to prevent the creation of 
criminals.  This indicates that there are three ways to decrease the amount of crime 
committed. 
1. Increase criminal justice resources (L) 
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2. Increase social programs (SP) 
3. Increase the severity of punishment (SV) 
(Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981) 
 
We also make the assumption that the functions are quasi-concave.  This 
assumption is created because of non-increasing returns to scale.  If society is 
rational they will allocate resources on those resources that will have the largest 
economic benefit for crime prevention.   Using this assumption we know that an 
optimal solution to this problem does exist. 
Proof: 
By creating a Lagrangian from equations 1 and equation 2 and taking the minimum 
 
 
 
taking the first order conditions with respect to our choice variables OF, L, SV and 
SE gives you (and assuming that r and L are scalars). 
 
 
 
Remember that g is the functional form of the offense rate, F is the functional form 
of the conviction ratio.  From equation 3 we know  is negative and   
is positive therefore the second term is negative, because it is subtracted it becomes 
a positive.  We also know that  is negative.  The left hand side of the equation is 
positive however, because both w* and r* are positive, therefore 
 )  ≥ abs( ).  And w* becomes larger or r* becomes smaller the difference 
between abs ) and  gets larger.   
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Removing the scalar assumption we have [w]•[r]-1 =  
 
We know that the f function is convex because of the assumptions we made in the 
model which is sufficient to prove that this optimal point is a minimum or a set of 
points which constitute a minimum.    
Using these assumption we have proven that there is an optimal point to 
which resources should be spent to minimize the cost of crime on a society.   
 We will now see how the model compares to the real world.   
 
Determining r 
 
As mentioned in the introduction it is very difficult to determine the loss a 
society incurs as a result of crime because the loss is not only monetary, but 
psychological as well.  There have been a number of studies to try to express this 
loss in monetary terms alone.  This includes the Wickersham Report, The 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967, 
however for this paper we will use the Sellin Wolfgang measure.  In 1964 Sellin and 
Wolfgang produced a study that is still widely used today to determine the 
monetary weights on a society.  They conducted an extensive survey to determine 
the seriousness of a particular crime by asking survey respondents consisting of 
judges, police officers and university students to give a numerical value for the 
crime according to a list of 141 different crimes.  If we combine their information 
with the President’s Commission Report then we are able to gain some intuition 
regarding the real cost of offenses.  This paper is reproducing the methodology for 
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finding the value associated with the Sellen-Wolfgang study and will later prove that 
the President’s Commission Report is no longer a feasible option for obtaining the 
values for r.   The Sellin-Wolfgang score for petty theft of $5 has a mean magnitude 
scale value of 22.09, this score is 69.13 for larceny of $5000 along that spectrum 
there is a linear relationship between the logarithms of the Selling Wolfgang Score 
and the dollar value loss.  By using this Phillips and Votey were able to create a 
monetary value for each of the crimes listed in Sellin Wolfgang study, an example of 
that survey with their corresponding economic cost is found in the index of this 
paper. (Sellin & E., 1978) (Phillips & Votey, Jr., 1981) 
Using this data we can create a measurement of our rOF value.  We are able 
to do this by using data from the United States Department of Criminal Justice which 
keeps track of federal crimes prosecuted each year.  We then are able to use the 
Phillips-Votey method for calculating social cost for the crime mentioned above.  We 
can compare this cost for crime prevention, which we calculated as the average per 
person cost spent on the criminal justice program.   
Although this list omits a number of less severe crimes that are subtracting 
from society; this study looks exclusively at: murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, aggravated assault, property crimes, burglary, larceny and motor 
vehicle theft, now taking those values and standardizing them by using the 
consumer price index (CPI) to the 1993 cost level, and comparing them against the 
cost spent on crime prevention for 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006 standardized 
them by using the 1993 CPI we are able to determine that the social cost of crime 
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decreases and at the same time spending on crime prevention increases. In this 
particular case m=6 If we multiply the probability of being a victim of a crime by 
cost associated with the crime we find that the total cost of crime is around $252.71 
the same individual would spend $131 on crime prevention.  In 1997 the social cost 
of crime was $206.71 per person.  The average cost for crime prevention was 
$135.05.  In 2000 the cost of crime dropped to $171.99 and society spent $150.21.   
In 2003, crime cost $169.07 and society spent $157.07in prevention.  In 2006 the 
cost of crime $162.85, and prevention cost $181.2 per person.  Looking at the data it 
is possible to see that for every year the data is available in the United States, there 
has been a decrease in crime and an increase in crime prevention.  Now the United 
States is spending more on preventing crime then the cost of crime is imposing on 
individuals in society.  As long as we take the assumption that society is optimizing 
we can assume that the cost of crime is born by more than just the individuals 
impacted by the crime.  There may be a number of reasons for this, people may be 
more aware of crime because of increased media coverage of crime, and so people 
not affected by the crime feel less safe with each crime committed because they are 
more aware of it (see appendix table 1 for data from original Sellin-Wolfgang study).   
Comparison of Crime Control Resource Expenditure to Loss Due To  Crime 
Year 1993 1997 2000 2003 2006 
 Crime Control  
 Resource 
 Expenditures  
$131 $135.05 $150.21 $157.07 $162.85 
Loss Due to 
Crime 
$252.71 $206.71 $171.99 $169.07 $181.2 
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Total Cost to 
Society 
$383.71 $341.76 $322.20 $326.24 $344.05 
(CPI provided by United States Department of Labor) 
Obviously with a fixed cost of crime control resources and decreasing crime 
we would expect that the United States would not increase spending on crime 
control.  This paper will now look at possible causes of this seemingly irrational 
behavior.  
Hypothesis: The Value of Life has increased faster than inflation 
The possible explanation for this would be an increase in the value of a 
human life.  Recall the Sellin Wolfgang study used the presidential commission 
report which created a value of statistical life (VSL) to create the monetary cost of 
homicide.   There has not been a reproduction of the VSL by a presidential 
commission report since the 1967 study, but there have been a number of studies 
conducted since that time from various federal agencies.  The Environmental 
Protection Agency in their report Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for Existing 
Stationary Compression Ignition Engines changed their VSL from 6.3 million to 9.1 
Million, well above the changes because of inflation to the determined value of life in 
the value of life study in the Presidential Commission.  The Food and Drug 
Administration also increased the VSL from $5 million in 2008 to 7.9 million this 
year.  And the Transportation department increased the VSL from $3.5 million to 
$6.1 million. This shows that a number of federal agencies have increased the value 
of life during that time.  With an increase at the top of the Sellin Wolfgang 
measurement, recall that the Sellin Wolfgang used the value of life created by the 
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presidential commission to determine what the value of murder is, the cost of crime 
would increase throughout the entire spectrum of values.    (Sinha, Depro, & Braun, 
2010) (Appelbaum, 2011) 
Understanding SE 
 
Throughout much of the literature regarding crime generation and crime 
control, many authors point to a black box of social economic factors having a large 
impact on crime generation.  Phillips and Votey point to it directly as the single 
cause of crime generation (see figure 1 appendix), but there has been little said 
about the specifics of the social economical cause for crime generation. One possible 
explanation is that people are driven to commit crime out of desperation, and if a 
society increased its resources to members of its society then that society would 
have fewer members causing crime, because of decreased competition for those 
resources.  The reasoning behind this hypothesis is as follows, with increased 
resources of normal goods received by an individual the marginal demand for that 
good diminishes, if the marginal benefit of the item is high then the marginal cost a 
person is willing to pay increases.  If we assume that we can monetize societal 
punitive measures such as a prison sentence, and the perceived odds of a person 
getting caught (and assuming that the individual is risk neutral and does not need 
increased incentives to participate in the action).  The cost of the act would be the 
cost associated with the punitive measure multiplied by the chance of getting 
caught.  This may be an economically viable solution for a criminal in a Jean Valjean 
situation in which an individual marginal benefit for stealing bread (life for him and 
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his family), but in which resources are plentiful and the cost of not stilling the bread 
is missing a meal as opposed to starving to death the individual may not be willing 
to take the risk because the marginal benefit is lower.  This would lead us to believe 
that decreased per capita GDP would cause increased crime.    
 The Economist presented evidence, at least in the United States of decreased 
crime rates associated with decreased GDP for the past recession.  In order to find 
the impact that per capita GDP has on crime, this paper looked at a data set of per 
capita GDP produced by the University of Pennsylvania to make my calculations of 
changes in crime with regards to the percentage change in GDP.  This paper looked 
at crime rates in both India and the United States to determine the effect that the 
annual change in real GDP has on crime rates.  The author of this paper chose those 
two countries because of the robust internal data set that they collect and because 
they represent a developed nation along with a developing nation. This is important 
to see if there is a point, possibly after all of the basic resources (food, shelter, and 
water) have been meet that an individual is not influenced by the desire to break the 
law in order to meet the high marginal benefits that the increased resources will 
allocate to that person.  These two countries have many similarities, they have 
representative government, they both have a similar legal system with the basis of 
the law being common law.  They both have the same three branches of 
government.  And although they have a few parts of their society that are different 
(e.g. caste system, legal corruption) the most significant difference is poverty rates.  
Comparing these two countries allows us to determine whether a country with a 
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high level of poverty has the same response to that of a country with low levels of 
poverty (poverty being defined as an annual income of less than 3000 a year). The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics provided data for the crime rates in the United States.  
The data for India is derived from the National Crime Records Bureau.   (The 
Economist Online, 2011) (Heston, Summers , & Aten, 2011) 
When preforming the OLS regression of crime with respect to change in per 
capita GDP, normalizing GDP in 2007 terms we find that in the United States when 
we run a normal OLS regression we get a coefficient of .09, but the adjusted R2 is 
only 0.0389 if we make an adjustment to fractional logit model it becomes 4.52 with 
a std error of 2.62.  This becomes significant at the .1 level, but our Adjusted R2 
decreases.  This shows very weak evidence that increases in the change of per capita 
GDP increases crime.   
Table 2 Fractional logit regression of total crime on change in GDP in U.S.A. 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -.3190 
(.1702) 
-1.848 .0670 
Change in GDP 4.5211 
(2.6249) 
1.722 .0914 
Adjusted R2 0.03859 
Table 3 Fractional Logit Regression of Burglary on change in GDP in U.S.A. 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -.8412 
(.2428) 
-2.365 .00112 
Change in GDP 15.2854 
(3.7441) 
4.082 .000168 
Adjusted R2 0.2423 
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Table 4 Fractional Logit Regression of Murder on change in GDP in U.S.A. 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -.0574 
(.0049) 
11.675 .0000 
Change in GDP .2863 
(.0759) 
3.772 .0004 
Adjusted R2 0.2125 
When this paper look at violent crime it saw that the change of per capita 
GDP using an OLS regression gives us a negative coefficient of -.0059 but the 
adjusted R2 is .0031 and the coefficient is not significant so there should not be any 
conclusion drawn from this regression.  The fractional logit regression shows a still 
negative coefficient, but the adjusted R2 is negative so there does not seem to by any 
relation between change in per capita GDP and violent crime.   
When this paper look at crime with a possible monetary gain it reported that 
OLS regression gives us a coefficient of -.0017 with a standard error of .008 but the 
adjusted R2 is negative so we cannot find any correlation there.  We get similar 
results with our fractional logit regression, it seems as though there is no 
correlation between monetary crime and changes in per capita GDP.   
Although the relationships between monetary crimes and change in per 
capita GDP seem spurious, this paper is able to see a few significant sub categories 
of nonmonetary crime.  When we perform a fractional logit regression on the per 
capita burglary on per capita change in GDP we can see that it is positive at a 
significant level.  This suggests that as the rewards from burglary increases because 
people have more money, because of these increased rewards criminals will be 
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more likely to rob.  Property crime also increases with increased GDP.  When we 
look at murder we also see strong evidence that changes in per capita GDP effect 
murder.  The Adjusted R2 was .1773 and was shown to be significant at 99%.   This 
suggests that increases in per capita GDP causes murder to increase.  This allows us 
to gain some insight into the cause of the spurious relationship between the changes 
in per capita GDP and changes in monetary crime.  The subcategories that have the 
largest effect on the regression theft had spurious results when it was regressed 
against changes in GDP.  From the data this paper used in the United States overall 
crime seems to be spurious with changes in GDP but certain subsectors of crime (i.e. 
burglary and murder) increase with increase GDP.  
Quantifying the results in India is a little more difficult because we are 
looking at IPC (India Penal Code) level crime or crime that is prosecuted at the 
national level, there have been a number of crimes that have become classified IPC 
in the last 50 years.  This effects our model in two different ways first it increases 
the total amount of crime committed after the new classification is determined 
second some of the crimes that were characterized as one type of crime or placed in 
the Other IPC crime category now have a new placement which causes sudden shifts 
in the subcategories when we incorporate the new category.  For example setting 
fire to somebody’s house in India in 1970 may have been considered as part of riot, 
murder, other ICP or just prosecuted at the Local and Special Law level (LSL) which 
is basically the provincial level in 1970, but when Arson became a category in the 
ICP in 1995 it pulled from all of those categories depending on how the criminal 
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justice system found would be the most advantageous way to prosecute the crime.  
In an effort to correct for this this paper will look at crime at the larger scale of 
monetary and nonmonetary gains.  This should mitigate the effects caused by 
pulling things across categories, but it does nothing to ameliorate the effect of 
pulling crimes from LPL to IPC.  So this paper will also look at a few subcategories 
that have information for a larger period of time are affected less by the 
introduction of a new category (i.e. murder, counterfeiting and rape). (National 
Crime Records Bureau, 2009) 
Running the regression from 1972 to 2009 allowed us to get results from our 
OLS regression of -3.786 *10-4 which suggests that we have a negative coefficient 
our standard error is 3.267*10-4 and our R2 is .0094 which is rather low as well.  
When we use a fractional logit model with v = .003 (v represents the upper limit to 
the model, the definition of v for the fractional logit model is defined better in the 
next section for readers not familiar with the variables defining the fractional logit 
model) we get a model that shows that our coefficient is negative and it is not 
significant at any level. Our R2 is still very low at .011.  In an effort to get more 
accurate results we will look at murder and burglary by themselves to determine if 
change in GDP has an effect on crime.  This result is likely from the change in 
classification of the data.   
When we look at murder and burglary alone we find using a fractional logit 
model again that increases in the change of GDP decreases murder this finding is 
significant at the 99% the standard error is .697 so unlike in the United States 
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periods of increased economic growth causes Indians to kill less not more.  When 
we run the fractional logit model with burglaries we find the same thing as in the 
United States.  Burglaries increase with positive changes to real GDP. Therefore 
widespread poverty is likely not the cause of burglary, more likely the financial 
reward resulting from the burglary is the cause of burglary.    
Table 5 Fractional Logit Regression of crime on change in GDP in India 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept .0019 
(.0000) 
82.926 .0000 
Change in GDP -.0004 
(.0003) 
-1.159 .2550 
Adjusted R2 0.0097 
Table 6 Fractional Logit Regression of burglary on change in GDP in India 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -.4141 
(.1408) 
-2.941 .0059 
Change in GDP -.0004 
(1.9957) 
2.451 .01955 
Adjusted R2 0.1251 
Table 7 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on change in GDP in India 
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -.0067 
(.0492) 
0.136 .8923 
Change in GDP -1.6623 
(.6978) 
-2.382 .0229 
Adjusted R2 0.143 
Expanding the model internationally 
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From equation 2 we were able to determine  where g is the 
functional form of OF.  Because r is fixed see appendix table 1 and S=rOF + wL + 
C1(SP) + C2(SV)  (equation 1) and SP=h(SE).  It is important to determine SE which 
will have the largest effect on OF resulting in the lowest S possible.  So we need to 
determine what aspect within SE which would cause the largest change in . 
Because the objective is determine the universal social economical causes of crime, 
this paper needed to find a criminal offense that would be determined in a similar 
manner in each of the criminal justice programs, was legally defined in each country 
as nearly the same thing, and for which we would be able to derive universal 
statistics. The best crime for that is murder.  Unlike other crimes it is universally 
described in the same way.  Also unlike other crimes which end up going unreported 
at a higher degree if the victims do not believe that the criminal justice system will 
produce results, murders unlike a number of white collar crimes are highly 
noticeable and visible. It has the added benefit of representing the largest price 
vector in r, which would make it a strongly correlated with rOF.  This paper would 
like to acknowledge the fact that extracting data from many different sources may 
cause a bias in the data.  This paper attempted to mitigate the bias by extracting my 
data from a single source.  The United Nations keeps track of all murders; they 
extract this data from the World Health Organization, Interpol, and the host 
countries crime reporting agencies.  Because these sources were not always the 
same this paper used reports from the World Health Organization first, followed by 
the any other international organization, if that was not available, this paper used 
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domestic data, this paper would like to acknowledge the fact that when all three 
data sources were available there existed slight variations between the sources.  The 
United Nations had only has available data from 2003 on, this caused a limit to the 
sample size.  Having stated this, the data analyzed in this paper still has a robust 
sample size consisting of 290 different samples.  Any regression conducted may 
have omitted some of the data if the independent variables were not in our dataset.   
 In order to determine the coefficients which have the largest impact on crime 
generation we need to look at existing models and theories.  Rosenfeld and Messner 
in their paper, the Social Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies were able 
to extract from the existing literature the leading causes of homicide.  A large 
amount of the existing literature looks toward inequality leading to a large level of 
lethal violence.  The argument is that as inequality increases in a society there is a 
large divide that separates the decision makers from the masses.  The law is 
therefore ineffective for protecting the masses and so they often take punitive 
measures themselves.  He later states that Knauft has found that simple societies 
(smaller less developed societies) which are extremely egalitarian often have 
similar acts of aggression because of the low likelihood of other punishment 
occurring from a government actor.  The other aspects that effect homicide are 
disorganization measures, things that cause sudden changes to moral codes or even 
population density.  He also hints at the possibility of envy by the people less 
wealthy masses.   Another aspect that Rosenfeld and Messner mention that may 
have an impact on crime are complexity measures such as political authority, 
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judicial authority, and organizational complexity.  This reasoning for this is similar 
to that of the inequality aspect, Rosenfeld and Messner state that determines 
whether or not the members of the society believe that the society has the ability to 
take punitive actions against offenders.  If they do not believe that they do then it is 
likely their criminal justice system will take action against criminals they will do so 
themselves.  One interesting aspect to consider here is that when an individual and 
not a society is to extract criminal justice by themselves it almost invariably results 
in afflicting pain or death on the criminal.  The reason for this is because the cost to 
the individual seeking justice would be too large for any other means.  (Rosenfeld & 
Messner, 1991) 
Steven Raphael presented data which indicated that unemployment 
decreases the amount of crime, but violent crime increases because of decreased 
employment.  Raphael used a normal OLS regression to create these findings across 
the United States, and then preformed a two stage least square to indicate the effect 
that crime has on unemployment.  This paper will reproduce the study across all 
nations, but because the OLS regression is not an ideal regression across this data 
(the dependent variable only deals in the positive realm and the dependent 
variables also are not continuous ( n+).  There cannot be a negative number of 
murders or even 1/3 of a murder).  This may be the reason for the low R2 results 
from the Raphael paper. In an effort to correct for this, this paper used a fractional 
logit model.  By doing so the resulting coefficients have a loss of accuracy, but we are 
able to better determine whether or not an independent variable has a positive or 
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negative effect on the dependent variable with more accuracy then with the OLS 
regression.  (Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001) 
The linear form of the fractional logit model used in this paper is ln(Y/(v– 
Y)=β’X + U, where v is the upper bound of the dependent variable.  The dependent 
variable is murders per 100,000 people the obvious upper cap would be 999,999; 
but that would not constitute a good upper bound, because it is beyond the scope of 
realistic estimates.  A more accurate upper bound for these societies with regards to 
the homicide rate is 80.  If we look at our dataset it becomes clear as to the 
reasoning for the rate.  Obviously 80 murders per year is well above the highest 
amount in the data set, but looking at the data set 80 is still a feasible number, it also 
allows for some of the higher data sets to have a positive coefficient.  This is 
important because it allows us to gain some efficiency because after the data 
manipulation the fractional logit model is increasing its R2 through turning into an 
OLS regression.  The obvious shortfall is that because we are using a fractional logit 
model we will have estimators with little to no meaning they are not the coefficient 
that fit the model, the most important aspect that we are determining is the sign of 
the estimators. Also because the outliers have a significant effect on the model 
countries like Columbia have a large effect on the regression (see figure 2 appendix) 
the author of this paper considered omitting these data points because of the strong 
impact they have on the model but decided against it because it would bias the 
model.  This paper just want the reader to be aware of this point.   
Results of our model 
32 
 
In order to test to see if Rosenfeld and Messner were correct when said that 
monetary inequality has an effect on our model, this paper used the Gini coefficient 
determined by the World Bank as an independent variable.  This paper selected the 
Gini index as a measure for inequality because it shows the distribution of 
consumption, the lower the coefficient the more egalitarian the society.  Then the 
author of this paper averaged the murders by all of the years available for that 
country.  Figure 3 (appendix) was the result.  The data looks as though as the Gini 
coefficient increases murder increases as well.  This means that as a country 
becomes less equal in their distribution of wealth, their rate of murder increases.  
With an OLS regression we get a coefficient of .8103 and a standard error of .1458.  
R2 is .374 it is significant at the 99.9% level.  When we use fractional logit model we 
get a positive coefficient at the 99.9% level as well which shows strong evidence 
showing that this coefficient is positive.   
Table 8 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index Worldwide  
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -23.2552 
(5.6206) 
-4.138 .0001 
Gini -.8103 
(.1458) 
5.556 .0000 
Adjusted R2 0.374 
When we look at the legal system of each country we are able to gain an idea 
of the effectiveness of their judicial system.  Using the Economist Intelligence Unit to 
look at the legal and regulatory risk factors, we are able to obtain an overall picture 
of how their judicial system works.  The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks the legal 
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system according to how “fair” their judicial system is.  The higher the number the 
more corrupt it is.  The Economist Intelligence Unit looks at how likely a person is to 
get an impartial trial, how likely a person is able to avoid prosecution because of 
people they know, or the individual’s influence from their wealth.  It also looks at 
the likelihood of a person going to jail because of political retaliation.  When we run 
a fractional logit model on this we see that the Gini index is still significant and that 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s assessment of legal and regulatory risk is also 
significant at the 95%.  By combining the two we get an adjust R2 of .4498.   
Table 9 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on Gini Index and legal risk 
worldwide  
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -7.1822 
(.0948) 
-11.061 .0000 
Gini -.0948 
(.0175) 
5.418 .0000 
Law .0120 
(.0060) 
2.009 .0503 
Adjusted R2 0.4498 
This finding suggest that Rosenfeld and Messner were correct the higher the 
inequality and the higher the less efficient the judicial system the higher the murder 
rate.  (See appendix for econometric coding using R) 
Looking at Steven Raphael’s paper when this paper replicated his OLS model 
utilizing a fractional logit model, and expanding it to cover 49 countries this paper 
was able to still obtain a positive coefficient with regards to the unemployment 
coefficient, this suggests that the coefficient is truly positive and that unemployment 
does cause murders to increase.  This is significant at the 99.9%.  
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Table 10 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, inequality, and 
legal risk worldwide  
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -4. 227 
(.1633) 
-22.885 .0000 
Unemployment .1350 
(.0180) 
7.517 .0000 
Adjusted R2 0.164 
In an effort to make the model even more robust, this paper combined both 
Raphael’s and Rosenfeld idea to see what would happen if we perform a fractional 
logit model to look at the effect that inequality, unemployment, and judicial and 
regulatory instability would have on the murder rate.  Because the World Bank is 
sporadic about collecting data to create the Gini Index this paper was able to create 
its own measure of inequality.  The design of my inequality index is quite separate 
from that of the Gini index, where the Gini index creates a number based on the 
inequality of consumption, my index is based off the idea that the larger the 
deviation from the income class that hold the majority the higher the number.  So if 
there is a society with a large number of households in one income group and 
another large portion of a society in a much more affluent income group, whereas 
the political elites in the higher income group would likely have more influence in 
law making and implementation, this country would have a very high inequality 
value.  For example apartheid South Africa would have a very large inequality value, 
where as a country that was more or less in the same income group such as 
Indonesia or the Czech Republic would have a low inequality value.  This value 
already has transfer payments included.  When this paper ran that regression it find 
35 
 
that unemployment is significant at the 99.9%, as well as legal and regulatory risk, 
both of those coefficients are positive.  Inequality is also positive, but only at the 
95%.  The R2 value is .3395.   
Table 11 Fractional Logit Regression of murder on unemployment, law and 
inequality worldwide  
Coefficient Estimate t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept -5.427 
(.0367) 
-14.881 .0000 
Unemployment .0959 
(.0021) 
4.586 .0000 
Inequality .0001 
(.0001) 
1.661 .0984 
Law .0269 
(.0043) 
6.314 .0000 
Adjusted R2 0.3395 
This finding shows evidence Raphael, Rosenfeild and Messer were right even 
if we expand our study across multiple countries and we use the fractional logit 
model. This evidence suggest that social economical programs that use transfer 
payments to make society more monetarily equal and programs that increase 
employment could be used to decrease the murder rates world wide.   
Effectiveness of Prisons 
 
A significant portion of the prison population is repeat offenders.  There is a 
50.1% chance that a released prisoner would be return to prison within 3 years. By 
reducing the amount of recidivism states have the opportunity to retard this 
mounting demand for prison space.  A number of costly measures are available to 
decrease the likelihood of recidivism among prison populations.  But the costs are 
prohibitive, so in order for these programs to have the largest effect, a number of 
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federal and local organizations have looked at the characteristics of inmates most at 
risk of recidivism in order to allocate resources in the most effective manner 
possible.  In this portion of my paper we will look at the static characteristics of the 
inmate population released in 1978, and attempts to isolate the characteristics of 
prisoners who are most likely to return to prison.  (Statistics, 2007) (Jacobson, 
2005). 
Using data collected from the North Carolina Prison system in 1977-78 and 
again in 1979-1980 by Schmidt and Witte (1989) we are able to gain some intuition 
as to the effectiveness of the prison system.  Although this data is rather dated it 
encompasses the most robust study this author could find with regards to the 
effectiveness of the modern prison system.   
The variables, selected by Schmidt and Witte, are not open to interpretation 
and therefore difficult to manipulate.  These variables are static by nature; a one-
time look at the conditions a prisoner is facing at the time of his/her release.  These 
models can easily be carried over across studies because they are almost universally 
defined in the same manner.   
This data included all inmates released between the periods of 1977 to 1978 
and 1979 to 1980.  It included 9457 individuals, but only 8849 are not missing 
information.   Listed in the next section of the paper are the variables and their 
definitions 
White:  A dummy variable equal to one for any race (including Oriental, Hispanic,  
 
Native American) that is not of African descent.   
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Alchy:  A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s record indicates a serious 
problem with Alcohol.   
Junky: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s record indicates a serious 
problem with hard drugs. 
Super:  A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate’s release was supervised 
(he/she was release on parole). 
Married: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate was married at the time of 
his/her release.   
Felon: A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate was in prison for a felony.   
Workrel:  A dummy variable equal to one if the individual participated in the work 
release program during their sentence.   
Propty: A dummy variable which is equal to one if the crime committed was a crime 
against property.   
Person:  A dummy variable equal to one if the crime committed was against a person 
(the crime could have been against a person and property in which case both this 
variable and propty would be one). 
Male:  A dummy variable equal to one if the inmate is a male.   
Priors:  The number of previous incarcerations not including the sample prison term 
School:  The number of years of formal schooling completed 
Rule: The number of rules broken by individual during their sentence 
Age:  The age (in months) of the inmate upon release.    
Tservd:  The time served (in months) of the sentence 
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Recid:  A dummy variable equal to one if the individual returned to jail within the 
follow up period (three years) 
Time:  The amount of time from one the person was release to the point at which the 
person returned to prison.  If the person did not return to person within the three 
years examined this variable is equal to zero.   
There are a number of possible variables listed above that may be correlated, 
this paper will address the issues here and explain what it did to decreased the 
multicollinearity problem in order to get a better R2.  It is safe to believe that Tservd 
and Rule would be correlated because the longer a person is in prison the more 
likely they are to break more rules the author of this paper divided rule by Tservd in 
order to make it rules per month.  This allowed us to normalize the number of rules 
broken to be uncorrelated with how long a person was in prison.  This paper also 
tested correlation between age and marriage, this was not statistically significant.   
Hypothesis  
In order to understand the reason for recidivism across these variables this 
paper created a constrained incentive structure.   
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u)) 
i,r,s,e 
 
S.t.Ē=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p) 
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1] 
vπ ≥0, vππ ≤0, πs ≥0, πss ≤0, πi≥0, πii ≤0, πr ≥0, πrr ≤ 0 wπ≥0, wππ ≤0 gs≤0, gss ≤0, ge 
≥0,gd≥0,gdd ≤ 0 ch ≥ 0, fp ≥ 0, fu≥0 ,Ap ≤0, Au ≤0,hp ≥0, ce ≤0,cp ≥0,cr ≥0 
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(equation 4)  
 I will breakdown the reasoning behind the functional form of this model in 
the next section, in this section this paper will concentrate solely on introducing the 
parameters. This model suggests that an inmate is attempting to maximize their 
utility (U) which is a function of the utility derived from the legal profits (v) and 
illegal profits (w), along with the discounted utility derived from their next period 
level of freedom (At+1) in our model this will be simplified to either free or in prison, 
but this could theoretically allow for a person on probation, or under alternative 
forms of incarceration such as house arrest.  At+1 is a function of priors (p) and 
amount of crime the criminal is engaged in (u).   This paper also assume that profit 
is modeled by the level of legal skills a person possess (s), such as literary, quantities 
and technical skills, in our model this paper will use amount of schooling to be a 
proxy for this, the amount of illegal skills a person has such as fraud, scamming, and 
hacking (i), and the level of risk a person is willing to engage in (r).   
 Next this paper created a constraint in the level of effort a person in willing 
to engage in, this constraint could represent how many hours that person works in a 
day (E).  The constraint is made up of the disutility function derived from using 
effort to gain money (g), this disutility function is a function of the level of effort put 
forth (e), the level of schooling an individual has (s) and the amount of 
discrimination which exists for the individual(d).  This is multiplied by the amount 
of utility from legal profits, and then multiplied by the expected value family 
function this condition function is conditional on the value in the next period’s 
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situation (E[f(p,u)|At+1]).  This is then multiplied by the housing function which is a 
function of priors (h(p)). 
  The next aspect of our model is the associated cost function of illegal 
activities, which is the expectation of their chance of getting caught conditional on 
the amount of illegal activity the criminal is  pursing and the level of illegal skills the 
criminal has (E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]).  This paper assumes that the expectation of the 
chance of getting caught is a function of hubris, effort, priors, and level of risk the 
individual is engaging in, multiplied by the expectation of the family function in the 
next period.   
Intuition for expected signs and magnitudes of parameter estimates 
 
 The model was created through interpretation of possible utility functions 
derived from explanations of criminal activity given by existing literature.  First it is 
important to separate the utility derived from the legal utility function and the 
illegal utility function in order to create a separate cost function, but the profit 
obtained from the two different activities may be different as well.   
Some criminals gain utility from the excitement of breaking the law.  At the same 
time some criminals may feel guilty for breaking the law.  Because of this this paper 
assumes that criminals would have different utility function derived from two 
different profit making activity, and this value may be different even though they 
obtain the same amount of profit.  In both of these cases this paper expects that the 
first derivative of the profit function would be positive.  The third aspect of the 
utility function is their state of being in the next period; the main purpose of prisons 
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is to be punitive.  Because this paper is looking at a static optimization problem, this 
paper assumes that the amount of prison time the individual faces in the next period 
would cause a decrease in utility.  The amount of time the person faces is 
determined by two different aspects; the type and amount of crime the criminal is 
convicted of, and with the introduction of the three strike program (a program that 
significantly increases punishment for criminals that have two previous crimes), the 
number of prior convictions.  This would cause At+1 to be negative in both u and p. 
The reason why the cost function incorporates the family is because the 
expected cost from the family function associated with legal activities may decrease 
the cost associated with pursuing legal profits.  The Vera Institute of Justice found 
that 
”families provide critical support early on… [recently released prisoners] 
received financial support from them as well.  Family members helped to 
locate work and encouraged abstinence from drugs and compliance with 
treatment…Offenders whose families accepted and supported them also have 
a higher level of confidence and were more successful and optimistic for their 
future.”   
 
So if in the next period the individual is free then this paper expects that the family 
function would have a value between 0 and 1 which would decrease the overall cost 
function associated with legal profits. (Petersilia, 2003)    
 The family function also may increase the cost function associated with the 
illegal activity value function this is very prominent with female prisoners.  Lipsey 
and Derzon found that the separation of a mother from her child was cited by the 
mother to be one of the most difficult aspects of imprisonment.  This would suggest 
that if a person is expect in the next period to be separated from their family 
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because they are participating in crime that the family function would add to cost 
making it a value greater than one.  (Petersilia, 2003) 
The reason why the effort utility function incorporates discrimination is 
because many professions discriminate against former prisoners.   
“There is a serious stigma attached to a criminal history – particularly a 
prison record in the legal labor market, and ex-offenders are often shut out 
from legitimate jobs.  Surveys of employers reveal a great reluctance to hire 
felony offenders…Even if ex-prisoners are able to find a job there is a 
substantial impact on future earnings (about 30 percent lower), and firms 
willing to hire ex-offenders tend to offer lower wages and fewer benefits” 
(Petersilia, 2003) 
 
This would suggest that partial derivative of g with respect to d would be positive.    
Housing also affects the cost structure of the legal utility profit function.  Many 
ex-prisoners experience a very difficult time finding suitable housing.  Because of 
parolee restrictions they are often not able to live with family and friends that have 
any criminal history.  They have an extremely difficult time finding any type of 
private housing because apartments require first and last month’s rent plus a 
security deposit.  And when prisoners are release from prison they usually do not 
have any money.  While private housing represents 97 percent of the total housing 
stock, a person still can try to obtain public housing, but most providers are 
required to deny public housing to felons.  This results in a large portion of former 
prisoners to become homeless.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 12 
percent of prisoners are homeless this becomes an issue because it decreases the 
chance of employment and reintegration into society.  A study by Bradley et al 
suggest  
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“Housing is the linchpin that holds the reintegration process together.  
Without a stable residence, continuity in substance abuse and mental health 
treatment is compromised.  Employment is often contingent upon a fixed 
living arrangement.” (Petersilia, 2003)  
  
This would lead us to believe that the partial derivative of h with respect to d would 
be positive. 
As this paper examines the effort utility function it see that it is a function of 
skill, effort, and discrimination.  The reason why discrimination is included is 
because it can have a large impact on the effort disutility function. This would cause 
the partial derivate of d with respect to g to be positive. 
“[race] affects every aspect of reentry; including communities labor markets, 
family welfare, government entitlements, and program innovations, which 
need to be culturally appropriate” “20 percent of black males will experience 
a prison term before reaching age 35.” (Petersilia, 2003) 
 
The reason why this paper included the s inside the g function in the effort 
function is because low skill labor is usually associated higher levels of manual 
labor.  But s also affects both the profitability of legal and illegal activity.  Finally this 
paper has discounted value of next periods punishment multiplied by the chance of 
getting caught as part of the cost function associated with illegal profits.  We would 
expect that the chance of getting caught would be determined by the person’s level 
of illegal activity and skills associated with performing illegal activities.  Because 
this is an expectation operator we will expect that k which is the value inside of the 
chance function associated with hubris.  This would cause the partial derivate of c 
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with respect to k to be negative.  But when you look at risk as a function of the 
chance function you would expect that the partial derivative to be positive.   
Test statistics and conclusions from the hypothesis 
From the theoretical model presented above our hypothesis is that the utility  
structure for a normal prisoner would look like  
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u)) 
i,r,s,e 
S.t.Ē=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p) 
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1] 
This would mean that we would have evidence that supports this model if Rule and 
Male were determined to be positive, and white, married, and school were negative 
because they have the largest one-sided effect on our model.  This paper would also 
expect that priors, Tserved would be near zero, or not significant because they are 
influenced by both sides of the model.      
Because this paper is working with a dichotomous dependent variable this 
paper ran a probit and logit regression on the 1978 cohort in order to determine the 
likelihood of recidivism.  The Logit test achieved a higher prediction rate.   The 
coefficents of our logit model are listed in table 2. Of the variable listed in table 2 the 
only ones that are significant at the 99% level are white, alchy, male, married, 
person, priors, school, rule, age and tservd.  Here is a table of the respective 
coefficients. Note that because we ran a logit model the coefficents are most 
important by telling the direction of the impact, if the coefficient sign is positive it 
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has a positive it increases the likelihood of a criminal returning to prison, if it is 
negative it decreases the likelihood.   
Table 13 Results from Logit Regression 1978 Cohort 
***Rule ***Male ***Alchy ***Priors TWorkrel Junky *Tservd 
1.4354 
(.3454) 
.6301 
(.1609) 
.5648 
(.0838) 
.1675 
(.0155) 
.1283 
(.0692) 
.0727 
(.0746) 
.0179 
(.0020) 
Super ***Age ***School Propty *Married *Person *White 
.0001 
(.0750) 
-.0046 
(.0004) 
-.0527 
(.0147) 
-.1141 
(.0836) 
-.1585 
(.0788) 
-.3190 
(.0788) 
-.5281 
(.2727) 
standard errors denoted in parenthesis.   
*** indicates that is significant at.001 level, * it is significant .05 level, t it is 
significant at .1 level 
 
You can use these coefficients to compare against my model.   
Max U (v(π(s,i,r)), w(π(s,i,r)),βAt+1(p,u)) 
i,r,s,e 
 
S.t.E=g(s,e,d)v(π(s,i,r))E[f(p,u)|At+1] h(p) 
+w(π(s,i,r))E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]E[f(p,u)|At+1] 
vπ ≥0, vππ ≤0, πs ≥0, πss ≤0, πi≥0, πii ≤0, πr ≥0, πrr ≤ 0 wπ≥0, wππ ≤0 gs≤0, gss ≤0, ge 
≥0,gd≥0,gdd ≤ 0 ch ≥ 0, fp ≥ 0, fu≥0 hp ≤0, ,Ap ≤0, Au ≤0,hp ≥0, ce ≤0,cp ≥0,cr ≥0  
The first coefficient, rule, is positive so it increases the likelihood of a person 
going to prison; it is also our best proxy for the w utility function, because it shows 
the willingness that a prisoner has to break the law in order to get what he wants 
inside of prison, this should also correspond to the willingness to break the rules to 
achieve gain outside of prison.  So as the weighted value of this utility function is 
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high relative to the v utility function you would expect that the person would break 
the law more often than someone with a lower w utility function, this would likely 
cause the person to be arrested and thus increase recidivism.  The next highest 
positive coefficient is male, but to understand why this coefficient has such a high 
value relative to the other variables we will look at it in terms of why being female 
would cause a negative coefficient.  If you recall from above one of the most difficult 
aspects of prison for females is the separation from young children, this will 
increase the cost function associated with E[f(p,u)|At+1] in the illegal activity side 
because the At+1 would likely correspond to being in prison, this would have a larger 
effect on most women then most men.  Because the cost function is higher with 
regard to utility gained from illegal activity you would expect a significant shift of 
women with young children to the legal side.  The model does not examine the 
utility structure associated with vices, so won’t try to fully explain the impact that 
alchy and junky has on our model, however, it is likely that the discount function (β) 
increases therefore the punitive aspect associated with next period may not matter 
as much as this moment’s benefit from participating in drug use.  This analysis is 
only relevant, however, in cases dealing with the use or pursuit of drugs.  The next 
largest positive coefficient is priors.  This affects a few different areas, because 
priors affects the disutility portion associated with our At+1 function You would 
expect that portion to decrease future crime involvement, but at the same time it 
would increase our i function.  Petersillia explains why the i function would be 
affected in her book When Prisoners come home. 
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“Criminologists have long suggested that prisons breed crime, act as schools 
for criminal learning, and produce a variety of criminogenic effects.  People 
who serve time in prisons often return home with stronger ties to other 
criminals, greater criminal skills, and more antisocial attitudes… 
imprisonment may actually serve to increase overall levels of crime in the 
community. “ 
 
Because i affects the profit function associated with illegal skills, and decreases the 
chance of getting caught, therefore, lowering the cost function utility from illegal 
activities this would cause the ex-prisoner to shift to illegal activities.   On top of that 
is a third aspect outside our model criminals have lower life spans, and because they 
die at a younger age, they have less opportunity to commit crime.  Because priors 
affects both disutility from committing crime and decreased cost of committing 
crime you would expect that the coefficient would be low, and the model does not 
predict the sign of priors well because it effects the cost function of both the legal 
and illegal side.   The sign of the coefficient is determined by which aspect 
dominates. You would expect tservd to act the same way.  The shortfall of the model 
corresponds with workrel, the shortfall may be because in this model and the 1980 
model this was determined not to be significant, so this paper need to collect more 
data to do a more robust analysis, but the reason why it may not be positive is that 
many work release programs do not increase legal skills.  Many work release 
programs are oriented towards low skill manual labor, thus not having any effect on 
the model.  Supervision was also not significant, however the author of this paper 
ran an OLS regression on the inmate population which did return to jail against the 
length of time they returned and found that supervision caused the length of time to 
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be longer, supervision appears to increase the risk associated with getting caught 
which increases the cost function of illegal activities but does not increase the 
payout, but when the supervision ends the utility structure returns to normal.  Age 
is the next aspect, it is negative, but the negative aspect may correspond with 
increased mortality rates, this may be one of the reasons why you see higher a 
higher mean prison population today versus thirty years ago, as hospitalization 
care, especially trauma care goes up, life expectancy has increased across the entire 
population, but with better trauma care we would expect to see higher life 
expectancy of incarcerated people.   As for school we are using it as a proxy for legal 
skills (s) this affects both profit functions, but it decreases g(•) which means the cost 
function of legal profit decreases resulting in decreased recidivism.  This 
corresponds with the negative coefficient we get from the logit regression.  This 
model does not explain why crimes to property or to a person may decrease crime.  
The married function increases the cost to illegal profits via the E[f(p,u)|At+1] 
function, but it does not affect the legal profit cost function which is one reason why 
we would expect it to have a negative coefficient on recidivism.  The last coefficient 
is white; in order to understand the coefficient associated with race we look at the 
g(•)  function because it is a proxy for discrimination we would expect that gd to be 
increasing causing the cost associated with legal profit utility to increase.  We would 
expect to see a substitution to illegal profits as gd increases.  When we ran the 1980s 
data we achieved similar results.   
Table 14 Results from Logit Regression 1980s Cohort 
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***Rule ***Alchy ***Male tWorkrel ***Priors ***Tservd *Age ***Scho
ol 
*Perso
n 
***Marrie
d 
***Whit
e 
.98540
7 
(.2519) 
.436371 
(.0647) 
.41472
8 
(.1387) 
.152354 
(.0629) 
.145214 
(.0132) 
.012597 
(.0015) 
-
.00434 
(.0004
) 
-.05268 
(.0135) 
-
.12078 
(.1012) 
-.24991 
(.0751) 
-.36406 
(.2485) 
(standard errors in parenthesis) *** indicates that is significant at.001 level, * it is 
significant .05 level, t it is significant at .1 level 
 
 We see similar magnitudes and orderings as in the previous case.  In each 
case we can see that variables that affect just one utility structure, without affecting 
the other will have larger effects in either the positive or negative direction 
depending on which cost structure they are affecting.  Variables that affect both cost 
structures tend to have coefficients closer to zero.  
 Both of these data sets support the Hypothesis.  We have evidence that 
supports this model if Rule and Male were determined to be positive, and white, 
married, and school were negative because they have the largest one-sided effect on 
our model.  Priors and Tserved are near zero, or not significant because they are 
influenced by both sides of the model.      
 Because the costs associated with changing different variables are not 
uniform it would helpful to look at the marginal effects of the variables. 
Table 15 Marginal Effects from Logit Regression   
White Alchy Male Super Married Propty Priors School Rule Age Tservd 
-.11443 .12918 .13989 -.00248 -.03533 -.01251 .03643 -.01051 .33718 -.00097 .00393 
Although it would seem difficult to change some of these variables (white, male, 
married) because we have the theoretical model we may be able to effect the 
variables without changing them.  For example, it would be difficult to change 
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somebody’s race, but it would be less difficult to decrease discrimination through 
community education and outreach programs, and affirmative action mandates.  
According to the model this paper presented it would have similar effects.  We could 
affect the male variable via the family function, if prisons facilitated family visits we 
may see a stronger tie to family which would cause larger effects via the 
E[f(p,u)|At+1] function.  And if prisons offered marriage counseling it would have an 
effect on the E[f(p,u)|At+1] function as well.  The most important aspect may be an 
incentive scheme while in prison which rewards a prisoner who follows to rules. 
Supervision 
 
Because there was not a carefully selected control group which determined 
which criminals from our study were released with supervision in the Schmidt and 
Witte data set, the results were partially biased.  In the Schmidt and White case 
study the selection was based on the crime and personality of the crime.  However 
to get a better look at how Supervision may affect our model We will look at a Meta-
anaysis conducted by Douglas Lipton Robert Martinson and Judith Wilks in their 
book The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment A Survey of Treatment Evaluation 
Studies (1976) .  They performed a meta-analysis of a series of studies with regards 
to the effect of probation on both young (13-18) and older offenders.  After 
examining 17 studies which totaled about 20,000 subjects they were able to 
determine that with randomly assigned probation supervision, children with more 
intense supervision, meaning that the probation officer working with the child had 
less than 16 case loads, compared to the control in which the probation officer had a 
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case load of 50-101, were less likely to return to prison.  Because of the randomness 
of the probation selection their study may be less biased.  The results were lower 
recidivism within the time period in which the case worker is working with the 
individual.  Increased supervision would increase the cost of the program, which 
would cause an increase in our C1(SV) from the first equation and (E[c(k,e,p,r)|i,u]) 
from the second equation.  In fact on average the cost increased by 10 percent per 
case load.    We established that  (equation 3), and that  (equation 4) 
which would indicate that this will cause a decrease in the amount of crime 
produced.  Lipton et al.  concluded that “If the studies are pooled …all comparisons 
indicate that younger offenders under intensive supervision performed better than 
controls. (Lipton, Martinson, & Wilks, 1976) 
In the only cost study conducted by the group of surveys examined by Lipton 
et al, we find that intense supervision for girls had a greater decrease in the cost of 
crime prevention, Steward Adams (1965) found that in his study of young women in 
the criminal justice system that the control group cost $240 a month, which 
accounted for supervision, detention and placement cost compared to $185 for the 
group that was in the intensive supervision group.   
Time Served 
 Similar to the Supervision variable time served may be biased because of the 
fact that those criminals with longer time served are likely to have participated in 
more crime in their past, and the crime they committed had a larger impact on the 
social economical cost the society pays for crime.  The type of criminal with longer 
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time served would be more likely to commit a crime in the future.  So in order to get 
intuition for unbiased results we can look at a case study in San Diego.  In 1993 to 
2001, San Diego was forced to cut their criminal justice budget, it also decreased 
misdemeanor arrest by 1%, and prison sentences were reduced by 25%.  During 
this period of time violent crimes in San Diego decreased by 43%.  During that same 
period of time the nationwide average was a reduction by 23%.  By looking at that 
same time period we can see that of the states with the largest increases to prison 
their prison population (i.e. Idaho, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Texas, Mississippi, 
North Dakota, Montana, Tennessee, Colorado, and Utah) all of those states had an 
increase in the percentage of violent crime above the national average.  Of the 10 
states with the lowest percent increase in prisoners all except two of those states 
were below the national average.  Because nothing changed with the nature of the 
prisoners in any of these states this gives strong evidence that it the length of time 
served which cause an increase in the probability of crime increasing. (Jacobson, 
2005) 
Conclusion 
 Using the Philip-Votey Model this paper was able to prove that there is an 
optimal point in which resources should be allocated to minimize the cost of crime.  
This paper then used the measurement for the cost of the offense function 
introduced by the Philip-Votey model, the Sellin-Wolfgang measurement.  This 
measurement used the Presidential Commission report to create an upper bound 
for the price vector.  The Sellin-Wolfgang measurement then log linearized the 
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results of their survey to determine the cost associated with each crime.  This paper 
showed that if we use the assumption that our society is optimizing their resources 
the upper bound of this Sellin Wolfgang study is  no longer correct, and the upper 
bound would be higher and dynamically increasing each year.   
 The Phillip-Votey did not elaborate on the social economic causes which 
cause crime generation.  In order to determine what those causes are we looked at 
the studies produced by Liska, Chamlin, and Reed in their book Testing the Economic 
Production and Conflict Models of Crime Control showed that inequality, and racism .  
Then this paper looked at Richard Rosenfeld and Steven Messner paper The Social 
Sources of Homicide in Different Types of Societies, which showed that inequality and 
ineffective legal system, cause increased levels of crime.  Then we looked at Ralphael 
Winter-Ebmer’s paper The Effect of Unemployment on Crime which showed 
unemployment increases crime.  This paper expanded the data internationally, and 
uses a fractional logit model to increase efficiency.  We use the hypothesis that 
unemployment, inequality, and a corrupt legal system will cause increased crime.  
This unemployment and a corrupt legal system was proven to significant at the 
99.9%.  Inequality was proven to be significant at the 90% level. 
 We then looked at the sector of society that had the largest effect on the cost 
of crime control resources the prison system and created a hypothsis for the utility 
structure faced by a prisoner 
The Hypothesized model showed that the largest impact on whether or not a 
criminal would return to committing crime were the demographics of  associated 
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with Rule and Male white, married, and school because they have the largest one-
sided effect on our model.  This paper would also expect that priors, Tserved would 
be near zero, or not significant because they are influenced by both sides of the 
model. This is what our model show.  This finding supports evidence that if a state 
worked on shaping a criminal utility function with regards to payoffs of crime, 
increasing family relations during time incarcerated, decreasing racism, and 
increasing levels of schooling they should be able to have a lower recidivism rate 
than by just increasing prison sentences.   
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Appendix: 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the total cost of Society by crime between the years 1993-2006 
 
Figure 2 
Adaption of Phillips-Votey Figure 2.1 illustration A Schematic Illustration of Crime 
Generation and Crime Cost  
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This shows that as the number of offenses increases the conviction ratio will 
decrease, this means that as more people commit crimes a lower percent of them 
will be successfully convicted, without changes to the allotment of resources.  The 
second derivative shows that it is decreasing at a decreasing rate.  The third 
function shows that as resources for convictions increase the conviction ratio will 
increase.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
This chart is the average number of murders per 100,000 people for the years we 
have on record.  It shows a thick clustering near the bottom of the chart, and the 
majority (37 of the 51 countries represented) have a murder rate of less than five 
people per 100,000 people.   All except 9 countries are less than a murder rate of 10 
people per 100,000 people.  It is those remaining nine, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain, 
Russia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Chili, and Brazil which have a significant 
impact on our model.    
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
This shows how murders increase with a higher gini coefficient.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 Estimates of Social Loss Rates for 61 Offenses (in 1979 dollars): Derived by 
Phillips and Votey 
 
Homicide     $360,729 
Rape      $27,958.30 
Selling Heroin    $11,278.20 
Kidnapping-$1000 Ransom paid  $11,278.20 
Perjury     $7308.27 
Assault-Victim Hospitalized   $6986.68 
Robbery with Weapon   $5439.73 
Arson-Set Fire to Garage   $5439.73 
Incest-Intercourse with Sister  $3855.55 
Robbery without Weapon   $3249.81 
Assault-Victim Treated, Released  $1580.88 
Larceny $12255    $1568.32 
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Embezzled $1000 from Employer  $1435.26 
Auto Theft     $1,364.74 
Offender Exposes Genitals in public $938.68 
Burglary     $926.19 
Illegal Possession of Gun   $917.61 
Larceny $2451    $724.26 
Running a Gambling House   $412.02 
Check Fraud-Singing False Name  $367.68 
Incest-Intercourse with Stepdaughter $295.61 
Passing Worthless Checks   $257.37 
Larceny between $100 and $2500  $242.63 
Larceny $122.55    $170.47 
Prostitute in House of Prostitution  $111.24 
Possession of Heroin    $101.64 
Larceny $49.02    $110.78 
Soliciting Act of Prostitution  $110.54 
Pimping     $85.68 
Embezzle $5.00    $68.84 
Selling Alcohol Illegally   $62.54 
Larceny $12.25    $56.98 
Dangerous Use of Firearms   $47.22 
Throwing a Rock Through Window $42.63 
Receiving Stolen Property $100-$2500 $23.83 
Madam in House of Prostitution  $23.03 
Participating in Dice Game in Alley  $21.58 
Receiving Stolen Property <$100   $18.52 
Glue Sniffing     $18.52 
Juvenile Drunk on Street   $14.17 
False Fire Alarm    $13.28 
Prowler-Back Yard of Residence  $12.50 
Trespassing     $10.32 
Offender Takes Bets on Numbers  $8.84 
Customer: in House of Prostitution  $7.50 
Beyond Control of Parents   $5.00  
Parole Violation-Juvenile   $5.00 
Customer in Gambling House  $3.94 
Check Cashed: with Insufficient Funds $3.39 
Obscene Phone Call    $3.30 
Game Law Violation    $1.98 
Incorrigibility    $1.82 
Loitering     $1.15 
Act of Prostitution    $.82 
Wayward     $.73 
Liquor Law Violation   $.66 
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Runaway     $.57 
Disturbing the Peace    $.45 
Truancy     $.15 
Vagrancy     $.09 
Intoxicated in Public    $.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code for recidivism, and marginal effects 
 
 
R code 
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR") 
dat<-read.table("NC1978right.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
fulldat<-read.table("NC1978right.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR") 
M<-nrow(fulldat) 
N<-ncol(fulldat) 
olstest<-array(0,dim=c(M,N-4)) 
library(AER) 
fit.lpm<-coef(summary(lm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + junky + super + married + 
workrel + propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,  data=dat))) 
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel + 
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, 
family=binomial(link="probit"),  data = dat) 
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel + 
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, 
family=binomial(link="logit"),  data = dat) 
summary(fit.pro) 
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summary(fit.log) 
logLik(fit.pro) 
logLik(fit.log) 
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log)) 
results 
## compare against how long before they recidivised 
M<-nrow(fulldat) 
for(i in 1:M){ 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,1]<-fulldat$white[i],olstest[i,1]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,2]<-fulldat$alchy[i],olstest[i,2]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,3]<-fulldat$male[i],olstest[i,3]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,4]<-fulldat$junky[i],olstest[i,4]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,5]<-fulldat$super[i],olstest[i,5]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,6]<-fulldat$married[i],olstest[i,6]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,7]<-fulldat$workrel[i],olstest[i,7]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,8]<-fulldat$propty[i],olstest[i,8]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,9]<-fulldat$person[i],olstest[i,9]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,10]<-fulldat$priors[i],olstest[i,10]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,11]<-fulldat$school[i],olstest[i,11]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,12]<-fulldat$rule[i],olstest[i,12]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,13]<-fulldat$age[i],olstest[i,13]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,14]<-fulldat$tservd[i],olstest[i,14]<-NA) 
ifelse(fulldat$recid[i]==1,olstest[i,15]<-fulldat$time[i],olstest[i,15]<-NA) 
} 
ols<-na.omit(olstest) 
fit<-
lm(ols[,15]~ols[,1]+ols[,2]+ols[,3]+ols[,4]+ols[,5]+ols[,6]+ols[,7]+ols[,8]+ols[,9]+ols
[,10]+ols[,11]+ols[,12]+ols[,13]+ols[,14]) 
summary(fit) 
###Results 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 22.591576   3.777694   5.980 2.71e-09 *** 
ols[, 1]    -0.223891   0.895319  -0.250 0.802565     
ols[, 2]    -4.081673   1.084211  -3.765 0.000172 *** 
ols[, 3]    -1.218665   2.475544  -0.492 0.622584     
ols[, 4]     0.446185   0.988934   0.451 0.651919     
ols[, 5]     0.307782   1.000259   0.308 0.758346     
ols[, 6]     2.897378   1.072397   2.702 0.006965 **  
ols[, 7]    -0.466555   0.929228  -0.502 0.615670     
ols[, 8]    -0.300868   1.111694  -0.271 0.786702     
ols[, 9]     2.520027   2.136526   1.179 0.238365     
ols[, 10]   -0.708177   0.156360  -4.529 6.33e-06 *** 
ols[, 11]    0.141753   0.205830   0.689 0.491114     
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ols[, 12]   -8.350294   4.343779  -1.922 0.054727 .   
ols[, 13]    0.020194   0.005191   3.890 0.000104 *** 
ols[, 14]   -0.123017   0.019740  -6.232 5.80e-10 *** 
 
 
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors + 
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="probit"),  data = dat) 
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors + 
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"),  data = dat) 
summary(fit.pro) 
summary(fit.log) 
logLik(fit.pro) 
logLik(fit.log) 
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log)) 
## calculate marginal effects 
# First for the Probit Model 
k <- length(coef(fit.pro)) 
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.pro)) 
vars <- c("white", "alchy", "male","super", "married", "propty","priors", "school", 
"rule", "age", "tservd") 
X <- as.matrix(cbind(1, dat[, vars])) 
xbar <- apply(X, 2, mean) 
z <- dnorm(sum(xbar * b)) 
pro.me <- rep(0, k-1) 
for(i in 1:(k-1)) { 
  pro.me[i] <- z * b[i+1] 
} 
print(round(pro.me, 5)) 
# Logit Marginal effects: 
k<-length(coef(fit.log)) 
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.log)) 
w <- dlogis(sum(xbar * b)) 
log.me <- rep(0, k-1) 
for(i in 1:(k-1)) { 
  log.me[i] <- w * b[i+1] 
}    
print(round(log.me, 5)) 
##Our probit model is the best fitting 
### D - LR Test Statistic 
restricted.probit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=dat) 
restricted.logit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial, data=dat) 
LR.pro <- -2*(logLik(restricted.probit) - logLik(fit.pro))  
LR.log <- -2*(logLik(restricted.logit) - logLik(fit.log)) 
LR.pro 
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LR.log 
## allow our pro model to carry only significant level values 
fit.log <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors + 
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"),  data = dat) 
a<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro))) 
a 
percentage<-(a[1]+a[4])/sum(a) 
percentage 
## Goodness of fit via McFadden's pseudo-R2 
fit.log0<-update(fit.log, formula=.~1) 
1-as.vector(logLik(fit.log)/logLik(fit.log0)) 
## compair against 1980 data 
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR") 
dat<-read.table("NC1980right.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
fulldat<-read.table("NC1980right.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
setwd("C:\\Documents and Settings\\Fire_Hawk\\Desktop\\RRRRR") 
M<-nrow(fulldat) 
N<-ncol(fulldat) 
olstest<-array(0,dim=c(M,N-4)) 
library(AER) 
fit.lpm<-coef(summary(lm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + junky + super + married + 
workrel + propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd,  data=dat))) 
fit.pro <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel + 
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, 
family=binomial(link="probit"),  data = dat) 
fit.log<- glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male +junky + super + married + workrel + 
propty + person + priors + school + rule + age + tservd, 
family=binomial(link="logit"),  data = dat) 
summary(fit.pro) 
summary(fit.log) 
summary(fit.pro) 
summary(fit.log) 
logLik(fit.pro) 
logLik(fit.log) 
results<-cbind(coef(fit.pro), coef(fit.log)) 
write.csv(results, "poopstain.csv") 
## calculate marginal effects 
# First for the Probit Model 
k <- length(coef(fit.pro)) 
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.pro)) 
vars <- c("white", "alchy", "male","junky", "super", "married", "workrel", "propty", 
"person", "priors", "school", "rule", "age", "tservd") 
X <- as.matrix(cbind(1, dat[, vars])) 
xbar <- apply(X, 2, mean) 
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z <- dnorm(sum(xbar * b)) 
pro.me <- rep(0, k-1) 
for(i in 1:(k-1)) { 
  pro.me[i] <- z * b[i+1] 
} 
print(round(pro.me, 5)) 
# Logit Marginal effects: 
k<-length(coef(fit.log)) 
b <- as.matrix(coef(fit.log)) 
w <- dlogis(sum(xbar * b)) 
log.me <- rep(0, k-1) 
for(i in 1:(k-1)) { 
  log.me[i] <- w * b[i+1] 
}    
print(round(log.me, 5)) 
##C - Prediction tables 
b<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro)))  
c<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.log))) 
b 
c 
percentageb<-(b[1]+b[4])/sum(b) 
percentageb 
percentagec<-(c[1]+c[4])/sum(c) 
percentagec 
recid <- sum(fulldat[ ,17]) 
nonrecid <- nrow(fulldat)- recid 
recid 
nonrecid 
##Our probit model is the best fitting 
 
### D - LR Test Statistic 
restricted.probit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial(link="probit"), data=dat) 
restricted.logit <- glm(recid ~ 1, family=binomial, data=dat) 
LR.pro <- -2*(logLik(restricted.probit) - logLik(fit.pro))  
LR.log <- -2*(logLik(restricted.logit) - logLik(fit.log)) 
LR.pro 
LR.log 
## allow our pro model to carry only significant level values 
fit.log <-glm(recid ~ white + alchy + male + super + married + propty + priors + 
school + rule + age + tservd, family=binomial(link="logit"),  data = dat) 
## prediction table 
a<-table(true=fulldat$recid, pred=round(fitted(fit.pro))) 
a 
percentage<-(a[1]+a[4])/sum(a) 
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percentage 
## Goodness of fit via McFadden's pseudo-R2 
fit.log0<-update(fit.log, formula=.~1) 
1-as.vector(logLik(fit.log)/logLik(fit.log0)) 
 
 
Code for Determining SE portion of paper 
 
### r code for gdp and crime 
setwd("H:\\") 
dat<-read.table("gdpandcrime.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
M<-nrow(dat) 
N<-ncol(dat) 
olstesttotcrim<-array(0,dim=c(M,2)) 
 
## refrence for per capita GDP http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
 
 
## crime on per capita real GDP in USA 1960-2011 
 
 
 
fit<-lm(dat$TotalCrime~dat$change) 
 
 
summary(fit) 
 
fit<-lm(dat$fralogtotcrim~dat$change) 
summary(fit) 
 
### as GDP increases so does crime only significant at the 95% level low rsqrd 
 
#violentcrime<-as.numeric(dat$ViolentCrime) 
 
fit1<-lm(dat$TotalNOMONEY~dat$change) 
fit2<-lm(dat$TotalMONEY~dat$change) 
 
summary(fit1) 
summary(fit2) 
 
fit1<-lm(dat$fralogtotnomon~dat$change) 
fit2<-lm(dat$fralogtotmon~dat$change) 
 
summary(fit1) 
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summary(fit2) 
 
fit1<-lm(dat$fralogtotnomon~dat$changechange) 
fit2<-lm(dat$fralogtotcrim~dat$changechange) 
 
summary(fit1) 
summary(fit2) 
 
 
##find what increases with dat$change 
 
fit3<-lm(dat$fraclograp~dat$change) 
 
fit4<-lm(dat$fraclogrob~dat$change) 
 
fit5<-lm(dat$fraclogass~dat$change) 
 
fit6<-lm(dat$fraclogpro~dat$change) 
 
fit7<-lm(dat$fraclogbur~dat$change) 
 
fit8<-lm(dat$fraclogthe~dat$change) 
 
fit9<-lm(dat$VEHPER1000~dat$change) 
 
fit10<-lm(dat$murper1000~dat$change) 
 
summary(fit3) 
summary(fit4) 
summary(fit5) 
summary(fit6) 
summary(fit7) 
summary(fit8) 
summary(fit9) 
summary(fit10) 
 
dat0<-read.table("India.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
fitcrime<-lm(dat0$totalcrimperperson~dat0$changeingdp) 
summary(fitcrime) 
fitfraclog<-lm(dat0$fractcpp~dat0$changeingdp) 
summary(fitfraclog) 
 
fitmur<-lm(dat0$fracmur~dat0$changeingdp) 
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fitbur<-lm(dat0$fraclogbur~dat0$changeingdp) 
 
summary(fitmur) 
summary(fitbur) 
 
#http://ncrb.nic.in/CII-2009-NEW/cii-2009/Table%204.1.pdf 
#http://ncrb.nic.in/ 
#http://ncrb.nic.in/CII-2009-NEW/cii-2009/Table%20Contents.htm 
 
dat01<-read.table("gini2.csv",header = T, sep = ",") 
fitmur<-lm(dat01$avemurd~dat01$Gini) 
summary(fitmur) 
fitmur1<-lm(dat01$fracmur~dat01$Gini) 
summary(fitmur1) 
 
dat02<-read.table("gini3.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
fitmur<-lm(dat02$fracmur~dat02$Gini + dat02$law) 
 
 
dat1<-read.table("reui.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
 
names(dat1) 
 
fiteiu<-lm(dat1$Murder~ dat1$GDP.realchange) 
summary(fiteiu) 
fiteiu1<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$firstworld + dat1$GDP.realchange) 
summary(fiteiu1) 
 
##check geography 
fiteiu2<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$GDP.realchange) 
 
unemploymentpercent<-as.numeric(dat1$Recordedunemployment.) 
 
fiteiu3<-lm(dat1$Murder~unemploymentpercent) 
 
 
summary(fiteiu3) 
 
fiteiu3.0<-lm(dat1$fracmurd~unemploymentpercent) 
summary(fiteiu3.0) 
 
dat4<-read.table("reui3.csv", header= T, sep = ",") 
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fit1<-
lm(dat4$fracmurd~dat4$Recordedunemployment.+dat4$Inequality+dat4$Legal.re
gulatoryrisk.100.high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fiteiu3.1<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Male.ofpopulation) 
summary(fiteiu3.1) 
 
fiteiu4<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64) 
summary(fiteiu4) 
 
fiteiu5<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19) 
summary(fiteiu5) 
 
fiteiu6<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24) 
summary(fiteiu6) 
 
fiteiu7<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4) 
summary(fiteiu7) 
 
 
fiteiu8<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9) 
summary(fiteiu8) 
 
 
fiteiu9<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America + 
dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14) 
summary(fiteiu9) 
 
fiteiu10<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29) 
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summary(fiteiu10) 
 
fiteiu11<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34) 
summary(fiteiu11) 
 
fiteiu12<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39) 
summary(fiteiu12) 
 
fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44) 
summary(fiteiu13) 
 
fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49) 
summary(fiteiu13) 
 
fiteiu14<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54) 
summary(fiteiu14) 
 
fiteiu15<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59) 
summary(fiteiu15) 
 
fiteiu16<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64) 
summary(fiteiu16) 
 
fiteiu17<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69) 
summary(fiteiu17) 
 
fiteiu18<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74) 
summary(fiteiu18) 
 
fiteiu19<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79) 
summary(fiteiu19) 
 
fiteiu20<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84) 
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summary(fiteiu20) 
 
carsper1000<-as.numeric(dat1$Passengercars.stockper1.000pop.) 
 
fiteiu21<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + carsper1000) 
summary(fiteiu21) 
 
petrol<-as.numeric(dat1$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.) 
 
fiteiu22<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + petrol) 
summary(fiteiu22) 
 
fiteiu23<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa.) 
summary(fiteiu23) 
 
Employmentgrowth<-as.numeric(dat1$Employmentgrowth..pa.) 
 
fiteiu24<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + Employmentgrowth + petrol) 
summary(fiteiu24) 
 
 
fiteiu25<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR.) 
summary(fiteiu25) 
 
 
fiteiu26<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation) 
summary(fiteiu26) 
 
fiteiu27<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation) 
summary(fiteiu27) 
 
fiteiu28<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
dat1$Female.ofpopulation + petrol) 
summary(fiteiu28) 
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###Look at political and economic stability 
 
 
dat2<-read.table("reui2.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
 
fiteiu29<-lm(dat2$Murder~dat2$South.America + dat2$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
dat2$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + dat2$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+  
dat2$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ dat2$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. + 
dat2$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + dat2$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+ 
dat2$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + dat2$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. 
+ dat2$Pricecontrols.5.few. + dat2$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. + 
dat2$Stateownership.control.5.low. ) 
summary(fiteiu29) 
 
 
dat3<-read.table("reui2.csv", header = T, sep = ",") 
 
M<-na.omit(dat3) 
 
petrol<-as.numeric(M$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.) 
 
 
 
fiteiu30<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+  
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. + 
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+ 
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. + 
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. + 
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.) 
 
fiteiu31<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + petrol)  
 
summary(fiteiu30) 
 
fiteiu31<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+  
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. + 
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+ 
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. + 
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. + 
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.) 
 
summary(fiteiu31) 
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fiteiu32<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$X.ofHHsearning.US.10.000p.a.+ 
M$X.ofHHsearning.US.15.000p.a.+ M$Averagewages.monthly.+ 
M$Medianhouseholdincome.US.. + M$X.ofHHsearning.US.5.000p.a. + 
M$X.ofHHsearning.US.3.000p.a.+ M$X.ofHHsearning.US.1.000p.a. + 
M$.ofHHsearning.US$1,000p.a.+ M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Riskofsocialunrest.5.low.+  
M$Impactofcrime.5.low.+ M$Degreeofpropertyrightsprotection.5.high. + 
M$Settingupnewbusinesses.5.lowregulation. + M$Freedomtocompete.5.high.+ 
M$Promotionofcompetition.5.high. + M$Intellectualpropertyprotection.5.high. + 
M$Pricecontrols.5.few. + M$Lobbyingbyspecialinterestgroups.5.low. + 
M$Stateownership.control.5.low.) 
summary(fiteiu32) 
 
newdat1<-na.omit(dat1) 
 
petrol<-as.numeric(m$Petrolconsumption.tonnes.) 
 
fitM1<-lm(M$Murder~M$South.America + M$ofpopulationaged20.24 + 
M$Female.ofpopulation + petrol + M$Inequality) 
summary(fitM1) 
 
 
## determine the inequality =(((100-DB2)-(100-DC2))*1)+(((100-DB2)-(100-
DD2))*2)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DE2))*3)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DF2))*4)+(((100-DB2)-
(100-DG2))*5)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DH2)*6)+(((100-DB2)-(100-DI2))*7)+(((100-
DB2)-(100-DJ2))*8)+(((100-DC2)-(100-DD2))*1)+((DC2-DE2)*2)+((DC2-
DF2)*3)+((DC2-DG2)*4)+((DC2-DH2)*5)+((DC2-DI2)*5)+((DC2-DJ2)*6)+((DD2-
DE2)*1)+((DD2-DF2)*2)+((DD2-DG2)*3)+((DD2-DH2)*4)+((DD2-DI2)*5)+((DD2-
DJ2)*6)+((DE2-DF2)*1)+((DE2-DG2)*2)+((DE2-DH2)*3)+((DE2-DI2)*4)+((DE2-
DJ2)*5)+((DF2-DG2)*1)+((DF2-DH2)*2)+((DF2-DI2)*3)+((DF2-DJ2)*4)+((DG2-
DH2)*1)+((DG2-DI2)*2)+((DG2-DJ2)*3)+((DH2-DI2)*1)+((DH2-DJ2)*2)+((DI2-
DJ2)*1) 
 
Table results for the code 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Male.ofpopulation) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
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-20.252  -3.535  -2.322   0.580  39.447  
 
Coefficients: 
                       Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)            -25.9787    25.1076  -1.035   0.3017   
dat1$Asia                1.7489     9.6172   0.182   0.8558   
dat1$North.America       3.7669     9.8133   0.384   0.7014   
dat1$South.America      20.5515     9.6711   2.125   0.0345 * 
dat1$Europe              2.0332     9.5948   0.212   0.8323   
dat1$Africa              6.4962     9.7460   0.667   0.5056   
dat1$Oceania             0.1179     9.8024   0.012   0.9904   
dat1$Male.ofpopulation   0.5767     0.4591   1.256   0.2101   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.526 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3053,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2881  
F-statistic: 17.71 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.579  -3.211  -2.482   0.941  39.461  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                -5.58560   14.96388  -0.373   0.7092   
dat1$Asia                   0.82984    9.64803   0.086   0.9315   
dat1$North.America          2.49888    9.81622   0.255   0.7992   
dat1$South.America         19.93390    9.67865   2.060   0.0404 * 
dat1$Europe                 0.44592    9.60462   0.046   0.9630   
dat1$Africa                 7.19340    9.76401   0.737   0.4619   
dat1$Oceania                0.05579    9.82093   0.006   0.9955   
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.64  0.13792    0.18094   0.762   0.4466   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.543 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3029,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2856  
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F-statistic:  17.5 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.309  -3.118  -1.891   0.087  40.456  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 -5.9721    10.2491  -0.583   0.5606   
dat1$Asia                    2.5628     9.5615   0.268   0.7889   
dat1$North.America           4.6784     9.7525   0.480   0.6318   
dat1$South.America          20.6090     9.5999   2.147   0.0327 * 
dat1$Europe                  4.0281     9.5840   0.420   0.6746   
dat1$Africa                  6.0844     9.6814   0.628   0.5302   
dat1$Oceania                 1.7410     9.7594   0.178   0.8585   
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19   0.9265     0.3978   2.329   0.0206 * 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.462 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3146,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2976  
F-statistic: 18.49 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.087  -3.061  -1.731   0.189  39.198  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)                 -9.7923    10.3624  -0.945  0.34548    
dat1$Asia                    2.0370     9.4919   0.215  0.83023    
dat1$North.America           4.7158     9.6826   0.487  0.62661    
dat1$South.America          20.1947     9.5387   2.117  0.03512 *  
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dat1$Europe                  3.9301     9.4891   0.414  0.67907    
dat1$Africa                  5.3058     9.6316   0.551  0.58216    
dat1$Oceania                 1.6679     9.6905   0.172  0.86347    
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24   1.4598     0.4888   2.987  0.00307 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.405 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3228,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.306  
F-statistic: 19.21 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.834  -3.149  -2.344  -0.261  39.633  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                0.4734     9.9697   0.047   0.9622   
dat1$Asia                  1.8968     9.6430   0.197   0.8442   
dat1$North.America         3.5635     9.8272   0.363   0.7172   
dat1$South.America        20.0792     9.6734   2.076   0.0388 * 
dat1$Europe                2.2577     9.6641   0.234   0.8154   
dat1$Africa                6.4385     9.7655   0.659   0.5102   
dat1$Oceania               0.5015     9.8202   0.051   0.9593   
dat1$ofpopulationaged0.4   0.2727     0.2903   0.939   0.3484   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.538 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3036,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2863  
F-statistic: 17.56 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9) 
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Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.994  -3.163  -2.368   0.116  39.771  
 
Coefficients: 
                         Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                0.2836    10.3050   0.028   0.9781   
dat1$Asia                  2.0796     9.6829   0.215   0.8301   
dat1$North.America         3.7623     9.8771   0.381   0.7036   
dat1$South.America        20.2675     9.6850   2.093   0.0373 * 
dat1$Europe                2.4031     9.7569   0.246   0.8056   
dat1$Africa                6.9280     9.7577   0.710   0.4783   
dat1$Oceania               0.8511     9.8602   0.086   0.9313   
dat1$ofpopulationaged5.9   0.2700     0.3600   0.750   0.4539   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.543 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3028,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2855  
F-statistic:  17.5 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
>  
> fiteiu9<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + dat1$South.America 
+ dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14) 
> summary(fiteiu9) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.135  -3.149  -2.359  -0.070  39.958  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 -0.7974    10.3154  -0.077   0.9384   
dat1$Asia                    2.1684     9.6573   0.225   0.8225   
dat1$North.America           3.9421     9.8536   0.400   0.6894   
dat1$South.America          20.3984     9.6784   2.108   0.0359 * 
dat1$Europe                  2.7255     9.7179   0.280   0.7793   
dat1$Africa                  6.8896     9.7496   0.707   0.4804   
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dat1$Oceania                 1.0946     9.8527   0.111   0.9116   
dat1$ofpopulationaged10.14   0.3701     0.3644   1.016   0.3106   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.535 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.304,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.2867  
F-statistic: 17.59 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu10<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29) 
> summary(fiteiu10) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.096  -3.729  -1.661   0.532  38.511  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                -10.3568    10.8010  -0.959   0.3384   
dat1$Asia                    1.7740     9.5272   0.186   0.8524   
dat1$North.America           4.6599     9.7250   0.479   0.6322   
dat1$South.America          20.1735     9.5757   2.107   0.0360 * 
dat1$Europe                  2.8746     9.5026   0.303   0.7625   
dat1$Africa                  6.4634     9.6553   0.669   0.5038   
dat1$Oceania                 1.7963     9.7353   0.185   0.8537   
dat1$ofpopulationaged25.29   1.6139     0.6245   2.584   0.0103 * 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.442 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3176,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3007  
F-statistic: 18.75 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
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> fiteiu11<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34) 
> summary(fiteiu11) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.173  -3.642  -2.315   0.635  38.060  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 -8.3072    11.2456  -0.739   0.4607   
dat1$Asia                    1.2473     9.5760   0.130   0.8965   
dat1$North.America           4.0158     9.7703   0.411   0.6814   
dat1$South.America          20.4731     9.6294   2.126   0.0344 * 
dat1$Europe                  1.7119     9.5324   0.180   0.8576   
dat1$Africa                  7.7988     9.7159   0.803   0.4228   
dat1$Oceania                 1.1334     9.7795   0.116   0.9078   
dat1$ofpopulationaged30.34   1.4566     0.7634   1.908   0.0574 . 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.492 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3103,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2932  
F-statistic: 18.13 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu12<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39) 
> summary(fiteiu12) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
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-19.722  -3.411  -2.333   1.223  39.306  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                  1.4838    10.6580   0.139   0.8894   
dat1$Asia                    1.1889     9.6409   0.123   0.9019   
dat1$North.America           2.8707     9.8122   0.293   0.7701   
dat1$South.America          20.0222     9.6861   2.067   0.0396 * 
dat1$Europe                  0.9281     9.5866   0.097   0.9229   
dat1$Africa                  7.1269     9.7820   0.729   0.4669   
dat1$Oceania                 0.1923     9.8274   0.020   0.9844   
dat1$ofpopulationaged35.39   0.2417     0.6663   0.363   0.7171   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.55 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3018,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2844  
F-statistic: 17.41 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu13<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44) 
> summary(fiteiu13) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.576  -3.536  -2.361   1.159  39.421  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 0.69077   10.20555   0.068   0.9461   
dat1$Asia                   0.96024    9.64232   0.100   0.9207   
dat1$North.America          2.44172    9.82515   0.249   0.8039   
dat1$South.America         19.91613    9.68072   2.057   0.0406 * 
dat1$Europe                 0.55247    9.60038   0.058   0.9542   
dat1$Africa                 7.27139    9.77228   0.744   0.4574   
dat1$Oceania               -0.02238    9.82566  -0.002   0.9982   
dat1$ofpopulationaged40.44  0.40471    0.58277   0.694   0.4880   
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--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.545 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3026,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2853  
F-statistic: 17.48 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.644  -3.246  -2.369   1.251  39.544  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 2.69342   10.01129   0.269   0.7881   
dat1$Asia                   1.18351    9.66483   0.122   0.9026   
dat1$North.America          2.68567    9.87220   0.272   0.7858   
dat1$South.America         19.95404    9.69201   2.059   0.0404 * 
dat1$Europe                 0.80736    9.65653   0.084   0.9334   
dat1$Africa                 6.97778    9.77325   0.714   0.4758   
dat1$Oceania                0.07309    9.85037   0.007   0.9941   
dat1$ofpopulationaged45.49  0.09933    0.58763   0.169   0.8659   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.552 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3015,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2842  
F-statistic: 17.39 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu14<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54) 
> summary(fiteiu14) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54) 
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Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.359  -3.305  -1.992   0.121  38.820  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                  7.3495     9.7879   0.751   0.4534   
dat1$Asia                    2.4874     9.6083   0.259   0.7959   
dat1$North.America           4.6615     9.8138   0.475   0.6352   
dat1$South.America          20.4630     9.6388   2.123   0.0346 * 
dat1$Europe                  3.4588     9.6353   0.359   0.7199   
dat1$Africa                  6.4062     9.7184   0.659   0.5103   
dat1$Oceania                 1.4086     9.8007   0.144   0.8858   
dat1$ofpopulationaged50.54  -0.9880     0.5606  -1.762   0.0791 . 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.501 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.309,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.2919  
F-statistic: 18.02 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu15<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59) 
> summary(fiteiu15) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.529  -3.222  -1.914   0.724  38.974  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)                  8.0861     9.5157   0.850  0.39618    
dat1$Asia                    2.8829     9.4853   0.304  0.76140    
dat1$North.America           5.5482     9.6833   0.573  0.56712    
dat1$South.America          20.6332     9.5239   2.166  0.03111 *  
dat1$Europe                  5.0796     9.5101   0.534  0.59367    
dat1$Africa                  6.4000     9.6010   0.667  0.50558    
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dat1$Oceania                 2.3336     9.6849   0.241  0.80977    
dat1$ofpopulationaged55.59  -1.4806     0.4696  -3.153  0.00179 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.389 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3252,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3085  
F-statistic: 19.42 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu16<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64) 
> summary(fiteiu16) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.365  -3.319  -1.813   0.708  38.776  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)                  7.8518     9.4746   0.829   0.4080    
dat1$Asia                    2.7513     9.4640   0.291   0.7715    
dat1$North.America           5.3814     9.6572   0.557   0.5778    
dat1$South.America          20.5856     9.5053   2.166   0.0312 *  
dat1$Europe                  5.3020     9.4924   0.559   0.5769    
dat1$Africa                  6.2676     9.5834   0.654   0.5136    
dat1$Oceania                 2.2346     9.6622   0.231   0.8173    
dat1$ofpopulationaged60.64  -1.7892     0.5381  -3.325   0.0010 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.371 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3278,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3111  
F-statistic: 19.64 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
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    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.948  -3.456  -2.182  -0.033  39.935  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                   5.617      9.590   0.586   0.5585   
dat1$Asia                     2.351      9.599   0.245   0.8067   
dat1$North.America            4.056      9.779   0.415   0.6786   
dat1$South.America           20.233      9.633   2.100   0.0366 * 
dat1$Europe                   3.788      9.653   0.392   0.6950   
dat1$Africa                   6.479      9.714   0.667   0.5053   
dat1$Oceania                  1.144      9.787   0.117   0.9070   
dat1$ofpopulationaged65.69   -1.151      0.633  -1.818   0.0701 . 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.497 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3095,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2924  
F-statistic: 18.06 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.974  -3.407  -2.067   0.208  40.374  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                  4.7721     9.5722   0.499   0.6185   
dat1$Asia                    2.1531     9.6159   0.224   0.8230   
dat1$North.America           4.0428     9.8068   0.412   0.6805   
dat1$South.America          20.2694     9.6514   2.100   0.0366 * 
dat1$Europe                  3.4802     9.6898   0.359   0.7197   
dat1$Africa                  6.6514     9.7302   0.684   0.4948   
dat1$Oceania                 1.0146     9.8063   0.103   0.9177   
dat1$ofpopulationaged70.74  -1.0480     0.6982  -1.501   0.1345   
--- 
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Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.515 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.307,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.2898  
F-statistic: 17.84 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
>  
> fiteiu19<-lm(dat1$Murder~dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America + dat1$Europe +dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79) 
> summary(fiteiu19) 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.078  -3.252  -2.244   0.399  40.053  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                  4.2350     9.5543   0.443   0.6579   
dat1$Asia                    1.9651     9.6200   0.204   0.8383   
dat1$North.America           4.0511     9.8239   0.412   0.6804   
dat1$South.America          20.2749     9.6599   2.099   0.0367 * 
dat1$Europe                  3.2416     9.7026   0.334   0.7386   
dat1$Africa                  6.6688     9.7385   0.685   0.4940   
dat1$Oceania                 1.1077     9.8233   0.113   0.9103   
dat1$ofpopulationaged75.79  -1.0350     0.7762  -1.333   0.1835   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.523 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3058,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2886  
F-statistic: 17.75 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
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-20.036  -3.191  -2.091   0.395  40.233  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                  4.1117     9.4888   0.433   0.6651   
dat1$Asia                    1.9421     9.5679   0.203   0.8393   
dat1$North.America           4.7103     9.7781   0.482   0.6304   
dat1$South.America          20.3363     9.6146   2.115   0.0353 * 
dat1$Europe                  3.9139     9.6128   0.407   0.6842   
dat1$Africa                  6.6695     9.6926   0.688   0.4920   
dat1$Oceania                 1.7161     9.7810   0.175   0.8608   
dat1$ofpopulationaged80.84  -1.8234     0.8683  -2.100   0.0366 * 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.479 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3122,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2951  
F-statistic: 18.28 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + carsper1000) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-18.372  -3.014  -2.020   0.230  40.005  
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)         3.380504   9.066117   0.373   0.7095   
dat1$Asia           1.994119   9.152421   0.218   0.8277   
dat1$North.America  5.598334   9.409099   0.595   0.5523   
dat1$South.America 18.673142   9.213566   2.027   0.0437 * 
dat1$Europe         3.604861   9.185686   0.392   0.6950   
dat1$Africa         9.266695   9.314840   0.995   0.3207   
dat1$Oceania        2.857173   9.419474   0.303   0.7619   
carsper1000        -0.007521   0.003672  -2.048   0.0415 * 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.066 on 273 degrees of freedom 
  (9 observations deleted due to missingness) 
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Multiple R-squared: 0.285,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.2666  
F-statistic: 15.54 on 7 and 273 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + petrol) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-23.787  -4.408  -1.191   0.810  37.136  
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        -3.981141   9.500003  -0.419 0.675486     
dat1$Asia           3.983400   9.422022   0.423 0.672781     
dat1$North.America  5.697233   9.596992   0.594 0.553224     
dat1$South.America 24.007882   9.503078   2.526 0.012074 *   
dat1$Europe         5.097505   9.407130   0.542 0.588331     
dat1$Africa         9.604581   9.548400   1.006 0.315334     
dat1$Oceania        5.126779   9.669803   0.530 0.596401     
petrol              0.035906   0.009371   3.832 0.000157 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.313 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.336,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.3195  
F-statistic: 20.39 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + 
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa.) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.233  -3.472  -2.184  -0.172  38.155  
 
Coefficients: 
                                     Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                            0.5139     9.6457   0.053   0.9575   
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dat1$Asia                              2.2992     9.6104   0.239   0.8111   
dat1$North.America                     3.9045     9.7878   0.399   0.6903   
dat1$South.America                    20.5331     9.6472   2.128   0.0342 * 
dat1$Europe                            3.1145     9.6262   0.324   0.7465   
dat1$Africa                            6.6740     9.7218   0.686   0.4930   
dat1$Oceania                           0.6779     9.7872   0.069   0.9448   
dat1$Workingagepopulationgrowth..pa.   1.2210     0.7408   1.648   0.1004   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.507 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3081,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2909  
F-statistic: 17.94 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + Employmentgrowth +  
    petrol) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-24.364  -4.631  -1.071   1.006  37.131  
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        -4.481259   9.538924  -0.470   0.6389     
dat1$Asia           4.078424   9.397365   0.434   0.6646     
dat1$North.America  5.777838   9.581650   0.603   0.5470     
dat1$South.America 24.371347   9.452654   2.578   0.0105 *   
dat1$Europe         5.319540   9.399749   0.566   0.5719     
dat1$Africa        13.837099   9.581905   1.444   0.1499     
dat1$Oceania        5.547524   9.630788   0.576   0.5651     
Employmentgrowth   -0.083719   0.298351  -0.281   0.7792     
petrol              0.040374   0.009408   4.291 2.46e-05 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.252 on 275 degrees of freedom 
  (6 observations deleted due to missingness) 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3577,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.339  
F-statistic: 19.14 on 8 and 275 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
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Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR.) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-19.697  -3.509  -2.390   1.282  39.424  
 
Coefficients: 
                                 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                       4.12125    9.58402   0.430   0.6675   
dat1$Asia                         1.07178    9.62464   0.111   0.9114   
dat1$North.America                2.37967    9.81100   0.243   0.8085   
dat1$South.America               19.63121    9.67968   2.028   0.0435 * 
dat1$Europe                       0.59819    9.57972   0.062   0.9503   
dat1$Africa                       7.67093    9.78200   0.784   0.4336   
dat1$Oceania                     -0.09693    9.81752  -0.010   0.9921   
dat1$Productivityofcapital.ICOR. -0.03144    0.03243  -0.970   0.3331   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.537 on 282 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3037,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.2865  
F-statistic: 17.58 on 7 and 282 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$Asia + dat1$North.America + 
dat1$South.America +  
    dat1$Europe + dat1$Africa + dat1$Oceania + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +  
    dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.642  -3.766  -1.644   0.157  39.292  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)   
(Intercept)                 23.3797    25.6366   0.912   0.3626   
dat1$Asia                    1.9392     9.5117   0.204   0.8386   
dat1$North.America           5.3019     9.7080   0.546   0.5854   
dat1$South.America          20.4479     9.5490   2.141   0.0331 * 
dat1$Europe                  4.2732     9.5432   0.448   0.6547   
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dat1$Africa                  4.6245     9.6384   0.480   0.6317   
dat1$Oceania                 1.1471     9.6998   0.118   0.9059   
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24   2.2350     1.0166   2.199   0.0287 * 
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19  -0.7344     0.8322  -0.883   0.3783   
dat1$Female.ofpopulation    -0.6640     0.4713  -1.409   0.1600   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.401 on 280 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3282,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3066  
F-statistic:  15.2 on 9 and 280 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +  
    dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19 + dat1$Female.ofpopulation) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-20.442  -3.683  -1.795  -0.161  39.168  
 
Coefficients: 
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)                 19.1690    22.6583   0.846    0.398     
dat1$South.America          16.9701     1.7654   9.613   <2e-16 *** 
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24   2.0687     0.9924   2.085    0.038 *   
dat1$ofpopulationaged15.19  -0.6894     0.8141  -0.847    0.398     
dat1$Female.ofpopulation    -0.4906     0.4300  -1.141    0.255     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.389 on 285 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.318,      Adjusted R-squared: 0.3085  
F-statistic: 33.23 on 4 and 285 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = dat1$Murder ~ dat1$South.America + dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24 +  
    dat1$Female.ofpopulation + petrol) 
 
Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-24.073  -3.757  -1.370   1.290  37.767  
 
Coefficients: 
                            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
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(Intercept)                 9.399164  21.147676   0.444 0.657052     
dat1$South.America         17.325886   1.717387  10.089  < 2e-16 *** 
dat1$ofpopulationaged20.24  1.131191   0.396684   2.852 0.004668 **  
dat1$Female.ofpopulation   -0.324025   0.394505  -0.821 0.412137     
petrol                      0.032490   0.008805   3.690 0.000268 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Residual standard error: 9.184 on 285 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.3475,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.3383  
F-statistic: 37.94 on 4 and 285 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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“Many writers claim that nearly all crime is caused by economic conditions, or in other words that 
poverty is practically the whole cause of crime. Endless statistics have been gathered on this 
subject which seem to show conclusively that property crimes are largely the result of the unequal 
distribution of wealth. But crime of any class cannot be safely ascribed to a single cause. Life is 
too complex, heredity is too variant and imperfect, too many separate things contribute to human 
behavior, to make it possible to trace all actions to a single cause. 
CLARENCE DARROW, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment 
